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1985] THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
EXCUSING THE CRAZY: THE 
INSANITY DEFENSE 
RECONSIDERED 
STEPHEN J. MORSE* 
779 
The shock generated by the verdict in the Hinckley case 1 has revived 
recurrent criticism and efforts to abolish or reform the insanity defense. 2 
Unpopular or even "wrong" verdicts occur in all areas of law, however, 
and should not spur intemperate attempts to change fundamentally just 
laws. Our task as a society is to decide whether the insanity defense is 
morally necessary. If we decide that it is, we must ensure that insanity 
defense trials are conducted rationally, that questionable verdicts are 
minimized, and that the disposition of those acquitted by reason of in-
sanity leads to the protection of society and the proper treatment of the 
persons acquitted. 
The purpose of this Article is to facilitate these tasks by considering 
both the substance and the procedure of the insanity defense and the 
most common suggestions for its abolition or reform. I believe that the 
insanity defense ought to be retained because it is basically just, and that 
sensible and fair reforms can remedy most of the problems associated 
with it. 3 Part I of this Article addresses the morality of the defense. Part 
Orrin B. Evans Professor of Law, University of Southern Californi a Law Center and Pro-
fessor of Psychia try and the Behavioral Sciences, Uni versity of Southern Califo rnia School of 
M edicine. A.B. 1966, Tufts University; J.D. 1970, Ph.D. (Psychology and Social Relations) 1973, 
Harvard U niversity. 
An ea rlier vers ion of this paper was submitted as testimony to the Subcommittee on Criminal 
Justice, Committ ee on the Judiciary of the United Sta tes H ouse of Representa tives, on September 9, 
1982. In its present form , it was first del ivered as a Harris Lecture a t the School o f Law, Indiana 
University, Bloomington and then presented to a Faculty Workshop at the University of Southern 
California Law Center. I t will appear in revised form in my forthcoming book, The Jurisprudence of 
Craziness, to be published by Oxford University Press. 
Special thanks are due to Michael M oore, W .T. Jones, Richard Craswell , Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Michael Levine, A lan Schwanz, Michael Shapiro, and Samuel Pillsbury, Jr. fo r thei r help. Michael 
Moore, especially, has consistently helped me to understand the underlying philosophical issues. 
I. Un ited States v. Hinckley , 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D. D.C 198 1), affd, 672 F.2d 115 (1982). 
2. See the Insanity Defen se Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 40 1, 1984 U.S. CoDE 
CONG. & AD. N Ews (98 Stat.) 2057. 
3. I must here confess past error and repudiate former views. I have previously argued that 
the impac t of mental disorder on c riminal res ponsibi lity cou ld be considered without retaining the 
insanity defense. Morse, Crazy Behavior. Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 
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II considers an array of criticisms that are often made, but that are insub-
stantial. Part III argues that the alternatives to the insanity defense are 
unacceptable. Part IV suggests practical reforms that should make the 
defense work better. 
I. THE MORAL BASIS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
The basic moral issue regarding the insan ity defense is whether it is 
just to hold responsible and punish a person who was extremely crazy at 
the time of the offense. 4 Those who believe that the insanity defense 
should be abolished must claim either that no defendant is extremely 
crazy at the time of the offense or that it is morally proper to convict and 
punish such people. Neither claim is easy to justify. 
In all societies some people at some times behave crazily-that IS, 
the behavior at those times is recognizably, aberrantly irrational. A 
small number of these people behave extremely crazily on occasion, in-
cluding those times when an offense is committed. A hypothetical de-
fendant with a delusional belief that he is the object of a murderous plot, 
who kills one of the alleged plotters after hallucinating that he hears the 
plotter's foul threats, is crazy. Such cases are rare, but clearly exist; the 
influence of extreme craziness on some criminal behavior cannot be 
denied. 
S. CA L. L. REv. 527, 640-45 ( 1978). F o r the reasons set forth in the present Article, I now bd ievc 
my prio r position was incorrect. 
Other writers who have recently addressed the insa nity defense deba te include N. MORRIS , 
i\1 ,\DNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 53-87 ( 1982); Bonnie, Th e Aloral Basis of the Insanity Defense, 
69 A. B.A. J. 194 ( 1983); Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational Approach 10 Irra tional 
Crimes, 47 Mo. L. REV. 605 (1982); Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HOSP. & COMM UN ITY 
PSYCHIATRY 636 (19 82). The in sanity defense has produced an extraord inarily voluminous litera-
lUre in the past. E.g., A. GOLDSTE IN, THE INSANITY D EFENSE ( 1967); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish 
the ·'Insanity Defense"- Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853 (I 963); Monahan, Abolish the Insan ity De-
fense?-Not Yet, 26 R UTGERS L. R EV. 719 ( 1973). See generally D . H ERMANN, THE I NSAN ITY 
DEFENSE: PHILOSO PHICAL, HISTOR ICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 153-80 (1983) (bibliography). 
4. I use the word "crazy" advisedly and with no lack of respec t for either disordered pe rsons 
or the profess iona ls who try to help them. It refers to behavior tha t is weird, loony, or nuts; less 
colloquially, it is behavior that seems inexplicably irrationa l. I chose the word "crazy" because l 
be lieve that it is the best generic term to describe the type of beha vio r tha t leads to a diagnosis o r 
labe l of mental disorder. At the same time, it avoids beggin g questi ons about whether the crazy 
person was capable of behaving less crazily. When one engages in th e discourse of illness, disease, or 
disorder, it is often assumed that the phenomena being discussed are uncontrollable manifesta tions 
o f abnormal biological processes. But the truth is that our understanding of behavior, in cluding very 
c razy behavior, is limited, and neither mental health sc ientists nor laypersons really know to what 
degree behavior of a ny sort can ac tua lly be con trolled . Thus, 1 prefer to use a nonjargon word to 
desc ribe the type of behavio r--crazy behavior-with which the law is concerned in insa nity defense 
cases. For a complete discussion of these issues, see Morse, supra no te 3, at 543-60. 
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For hundreds of years the common law has recognized the unfair-
ness of holding some crazy persons responsible for their criminal behav-
ior.5 The legal test for insanity, designed to identify the appropriate 
persons to be excused, has changed over the years. Whether the test 
seeks to excuse only those akin to wild beasts or also those who lack 
substantial capacity to conform their conduct to the requirements of law, 
the moral perception has remained constant: at least some crazy persons 
should be excused. Those who would abolish the defense must argue 
that no sound principles underlie the law's consistent retention of the 
defense. That most past discussions of the issue have failed clearly to 
identify such principles6 is hardly an argument that they do not exist. I 
maintain that such sound principles do exist; some persons whose crazi-
ness influences their criminal behavior cannot fairly be held responsible 
and thus do not deserve punishment. 
To justify the moral necessity of the insanity defense, I must set 
forth some assumptions I make about our system of criminal justice. 
Conviction and punishment are justified only if the defendant deserves 
them. The basic precondition for desert in all contexts, legal and other-
wise, is the actor's responsibility as a moral agent. Any condition or 
circumstance that sufficiently compromises responsibility must therefore 
negate desert; a just criminal law will incorporate such conditions and 
circumstances in its doctrines of excuse. A coherent, purely consequen-
tialist theory of criminal justice, while conceivable, is so unattractive 
morally that few persons, including most critics of the insanity defense, 
adhere to such a position. 7 Moreoever, our present system clearly rests 
on a much different basis: 8 our system of criminal justice accepts desert, 
whether viewed as a defining or limiting principle,9 as fundamental to 
guilt and punishment. 
5. The modern insanity defense dates at least from Hadfield's case. Rex v. Hadfield, 27 State 
Trials 1281 ( 1800). A modern insanity defense has also been a feature of continental law for at least 
two centuries. See, e.g .. R. NYE, CRIME, MADNESS, AND POLITICS IN MODERN FRANCE 28 (1984). 
6. Goldstein & Katz, supra note 3, at 859-63. Michael Moore has identified such principles in 
an excellent piece to which this Article is heavily indebted. Moore, Legal Conceptions of J'.1ental 
11/ness, in MENTAL ILLNESS: LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 25, 42-44, 56-62 (B. Brody & H. Engel-
hardt eds. 1980). 
7. B. Woo·rroN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE AND 
SociAL SCIENTIST (1963) is the best known example of a consequentialist view. 
8. Most modern commentators share this view. E.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 146-60, 
183; A. YON HIRSCH, DOING Jus·ncE 45-55 (1976). 
9. N. MoRRIS, supra note 3, at 182-83. Professor Morris defines a "defining principle" of 
punishment as one that would give the exact punishment to be imposed, and a "limiting principle" 
as one that would give the "outer limits of leniency and severity which should not be exceeded." !d. 
A system that requires proof of mens rea for most crimes is clearly a system based partly on desert. 
See Hart, Jr., The Aims of Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 401,407-08 (1958). 
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A. IRRATIONALITY AND COMPULSION: THE CRITERIA FOR EXCUSE 
The insanity defense is rooted in moral principles of excuse that are 
accepted in both ordinary human interaction and criminal law. Our in-
tuition is that minimal rationality (a cognitive capacity) and minimal 
self-control or lack of comiJulsion (a volitional capacity) are the essential 
preconditions for responsibility. 10 Young children are not considered re-
sponsible for the harms they cause prec isely because they lack these ca-
pacities. 11 Similarly, adults who cause harm while terrifically di straught 
because of a personal tragedy, for instance, will typically be thought less 
responsible and culpable for the harm than if they had been normally 
rational and in control. 12 Aristotle recognized these fundamental re-
quirements for responsibility by noting that persons may be less blame-
worthy for actions committed under the influence of mistake (a cognitive 
problem) or compulsion (a so-called volitional problem). 13 
Criminal law defenses that focus on the moral attributes of the de-
fendant are based on these same intuitions and principles. Even if the 
defendant's conduct fulfills the usual requirements for prima facie guilt-
that is, act, mental state, causation, result-the defendant will be found 
not guilty, not culpable, if the acts committed were the products of cog-
nitive (e.g., infancy) or volitional (e.g., duress) circumstances that were 
not under the defendant's control. These defenses are considered rele-
vant at the time of guilt determination as well as at the time of sentenc-
ing. It would be indeed illogical in a criminal justice system based partly 
on desert to hold that a defendant with a valid claim of duress is culpable 
(because he or she intended to do the compelled act), but then to decide 
to release the defendant because he or she does not deserve punishment. 
To convict a person with a meritorious defense would offend our concep-
tion of the relationship between legal guilt and blameworthiness. A per-
son acting under duress is not culpable, although it is unfortunate that a 
prohibited act has been committed. 
10. Although cases o f strict liability are excepti ons, penal sanctions for regulatory offenses are 
mora ll y hard to justify. Indeed, they a re usuall y justified on a consequential basis: as controllin g 
socia l harms without regard to the o ffender's fault. Morri ssette v. U nited States, 342 U .S. 246, 254-
60 (1 952). 
11. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 351-53 (1972) (disc uss ing the 
legal doctrine of infancy as an excuse). They may be res trained and trained to avoid ca usin g similar 
harms in the future, but they a re not considered culpable as fully responsible moral agents. 
12. See, e.g. , the Model Penal Code's doctrine of "extreme mental o r emotiona l dis turbance," 
which will reduce a homicide convic tion from murder to ·manslaughte r. MODEL P ENA L CODE 
§ 21 0. 3(l)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
13. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACH EAN ETHICS, Book III: Ch. 1 (R. McKeon ed. 1947). 
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In sum, the moral basis of the insanity defense is that there is no just 
punishment without desert and no desert without responsibility. Re-
sponsibility is, in turn, based on minimal cognitive and volitional compe-
tence. Thus, an actor who lacks such competence is not responsible, does 
not deserve punishment, and cannot justly be punished. 
The discussion so far has been premeditatedly vague about two is-
sues that must now be clarified: the meanings of rationality and compul-
sion and the extent to which these factors affect moral accountability. 
Rationality is notoriously hard to define, 14 but a reasonable working defi-
nition would include reference to both the sensibleness of the actor's 
goals and the logic of the means chosen to achieve them. It is, of course, 
difficult to say that the preferences or goals of another are irrational or 
not sensible, but there is no alternative to making these judgments within 
the social context in which those preferences are held. In a rough and 
ready fashion, we may ask whether, given the social context, any sense 
can be made of the actor's goals, whether any reasonable person could 
hold them, whether they are logically or empirically intelligible. Thus, in 
our society, it is generally considered rational to be a member of a so-
called "fringe" religion because our society approves of diverse religious 
beliefs. In contrast, it does not make sense to want (truly) to be a Mar-
tian. These judgments about the intelligibility or rationality of goals can 
be made so long as we recognize that few goals are rational or irrational 
in an ultimate sense and we make a general presumption in favor of 
rationality. 
It is easier to assess the rationality of the means an actor chooses to 
achieve goals because this assessment involves factual beliefs about the 
world or logical relationships. The inquiry becomes whether instrumen-
tal behavior is rationally connected to achieving identified goals. In Aris-
totelian terms, is the actor a good "practical reasoner"? As my colleague 
Scott Bice has shown so helpfully, an actor may be irrational about 
means/ends relationships in many respects. 15 First, an actor may believe 
that certain means will not achieve the preferred goal, but may employ 
those means nevertheless. If the actor's statements accurately reflect the 
preferred goals, this choice of means is a clear instance of irrationality. 
14. Brandt, The Concept of Rational Action, 9 Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 143, 143 (1983); Mack-
lin, Philosophical Conceptions of Rationality and Psychiatric Norions of Comperency, 57 SYNTHESE 
205, 205-06 (1983). See generally Frankena, Concepts of Rational Action in the Hisrory of Ethics, 9 
Soc. THEORY & PRAC. 165 (1983) (providing a history of past concepts of rational action). 
15. Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9-12 (1980) . The 
categorization in the text of this Article follows Dean Bice's categories precisely, although I have 
changed some of the examples. 
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Second, it may be that the actor believes that the means will achieve the 
preferred goals, but the belief is empirically unjustifiable. For example, a 
law student who wishes to succeed in law school, but tries to do so by 
minimizing class attendance or failing to complete assignments and by 
maximizing recreational reading instead, has an irrational belief about 
the means chosen. A third and related form of irrat ionality arises when 
the goal of the action conflicts with a goal the acto r considers superior. 
Suppose we ask our law student how getting a degree ranks compared to 
other goals. The law student responds that graduation is far superior to 
most other goals, including being well read . The student's behavior is 
then irrational because recreational reading is inconsistent with and in-
ferior to the higher ranked goal of graduating. A fourth type of irration-
ality about means exists when the actor believes the means chosen are a 
less efficient method to achieve a particular goal, but cannot give an in-
dependent and superior goal that the less effective means serves. This 
form of irrationality is well known to economists. Finally, the actor may 
believe the means chosen are the most efficient to achieve a goal, but the 
belief is empirically implausible. 
This list of types of means/ ends irrationality is surely not exhaustive 
or the only way to individuate the types of irrationality, but it does pro-
vide a framework for thinking about what instrumental irrationality 
means. If one tests this framework with cognitive craziness, say a delu-
sional belief system, it works very well indeed. For instance, the person 
who gouges his eye out because he believes he is the Lord's prophet and 
that mutilating himself will produce peace on earth, 16 surely has an intel-
ligible, rational goal, but the means chosen violates instrumental ration-
ality in a number of ways. If the actor has beliefs that are simply not 
justifiable on any reasonable view of the world and seems incapable of 
correcting the errors by logic or evidence, then it is fair to conclude that 
the actor is irrational with respect to the behavior in question. 
Now let us turn to a discussion of the criteria for compulsion. 
Although it is a vague concept at best, 17 we may define compulsion gen-
erally as hard choices that society cannot ask defendants to make at their 
peril. But what are the criteria of choices so hard that a defendant 's 
" wrong" choice should be excused? First, it must be the case that the 
defendant will experience substantially greater physical or psychological 
pain if he or she behaves lawfully/rightly than if he or she behaves un-
16. See Mayock v. Martin, 157 Conn. 56, 245 A.2d 574 ( 1968). 
17. Audi, Moral Responsibility, Freedom, and Compulsion, 11 AM. PHIL. Q. 1, 8 (1974). This 
exce llent , influential article has heav ily influenced my formu lat ion of compulsion. 
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lawfully/wrongly. 1R In other words, the pain produced by performing 
the lawful/right act must outweigh the pain produced by performing the 
unlawful/wrong act, the latter of which is usually a strong counterweight 
to wrongdoing. 19 Let us consider a range of examples. First, the typical 
case of duress fits this criterion: the defendant will suffer greater pain if 
he or she does not perform the commanded, wrongful deed than if he or 
she does. Now consider the drug dependent person (DDP) who is physi-
cally addicted to the drug. A DDP who does not take the drug will 
undergo the psychological and physical pain of withdrawal. This pain 
may very well be greater than the pain produced by fear of violating the 
law or by other psychological factors such as the loss of self-respect. Fi-
nally, take the hypothetical of a driver who rounds a turn on a mountain 
road and sees two children lying in the road. If the driver runs over the 
children, surely killing both of them, the driver lives; if the driver 
swerves to avoid them, the driver will go over the edge of the cliff, plung-
ing to a certain death. 20 Although theoretically all lives are equal, the 
immediate pain of losing one's own life is greater than the pain produced 
by the possibility that the law may punish the driver in the future. In all 
these cases, the actor is reasonably rational: the practical syllogism lead-
ing to action is logically intact, but the actor faces a very hard choice. 
The second criterion of a hard choice is that the actor's primary 
motivation for choosing the wrong alternative must be fear of the antici-
pated pain from choosing the right alternative. 21 Even if the right choice 
would produce more pain than the wrong choice, if the person chooses 
the wrong alternative for personal gain rather than for fear of pain, the 
choice is not hard because the action chosen is what the actor positively 
wants to do. Consider the example of Martin Luther. Failing to profess 
his faith (the "right" choice from the Church's viewpoint) would have 
caused greater pain than professing it, but his profession was hardly com-
pelled. It was not the fear of pain from failure to profess that motivated 
him; it was instead an affirmative, easy choice. By comparison, the per-
son subject to duress acts out of fear of the consequences of not following 
the command. The DDP may take drugs for fear of the pain abstinence 
will produce. By contrast, the person who takes drugs primarily for plea-
18. See id. at 7-8. I cannot provide a precise, scientific definition of "'psychological pain" be-
cause none exists. I mean nothing arcane by the phrase, however. 
19. See A. GOLDMAN, A THEORY OF HUMAN ACTION 123 (1970) ("A want is compulsive 
when it retains its strength or intensity despite apparently strong counter-forces."). 
20. SeeS. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRI!'Y1INAI. LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 798 
(4th ed. 1983) (using this hypothetical to elucidate the differences between necessity and duress). 
21. Audi, supra note 17, at 6. The actor need not be emotionally distraught, but the desire to 
avoid the greater pain must be the primary motivation for wrongdoing. 
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sure and not for fear of the pain of withdrawal is not compelled. The fear 
of pain often creates the driven, or pressured, quality typically associated 
with cases of compulsion: the feeling that the actor "had no choice." 
The last criterion of compulsion is that the actor should be excused 
onl y if there was no reasonable alternative to the wrong action. For ex-
ample, the duress excuse would not apply if the actor could have over-
come or escaped from the threatener without undue danger. The DDP 
would have no compulsion excuse to the crimes of possession and use, 
nor would the kleptomaniac have a defense to theft, if treatment pro-
grams or other alternatives were available but had not been tried in good 
faith. In most pure cases of inner compulsion, where the actor's rational-
ity is unimpaired, reasonable alternatives will be available. If a reason-
able alternative is available, it is fair to conclude that the choice was not 
too hard and that the actor may fairly be blamed and punished for the 
wrongdoing. 22 
Assessing the difficulty of a particular choice requires a quantitative 
and qualitative evaluation of the three criteria outlined above. In gen-
eral, the degree of compulsion increases in proportion to (1) the increase 
in the differential in pain between acting lawfully/rightly and unlaw-
fully / wrongly; (2) the increase in fear and decrease in personal gain as 
the motive for acting unlawfully/wrongly; and (3) the decrease in availa-
bility of and ease of using the alternatives. Although such evaluations 
are difficult to make, especially in cases of inner compulsions where there 
are fewer objective indicators, these guides to assessing the criteria for 
hardness of choice should furnish some benchmarks. 23 
22. A question about the reasonable alternative criterion is whether the availablity of alterna-
ti ves should be judged subjectively or objectively. In other words, should the excuse be allowed if 
the defendant was unaware of al ternat ives, or only if a reasonable person would have been unaware 
of alternat ives? Although it is more st ringent, the objective approach seems odd in the insanity 
defense context because awareness of alt ernati ves depends on cognitive rationality. Cognitive ration-
a lity is precisely what a defendant usuall y lacks where the insanity defense is trul y appropria te, 
howeve r, so the objective approach may appear unfair. But if the defendant is too irra tio na l to be 
aware of alternatives, then the irratio nality criteria for the insanity defense will be sa tisfi ed and the 
defendant will not need to rely on a cla im of compulsion. By contras t, it is fa ir to expect th at the 
rational defendant facin g a hard choice is capable of being aware of the reasonable alternati ves under 
the circumstances. Conseq uently , the objective approach is not unfai r, o r at least no more so than 
other objective tests of criminal liability. If the objective approach is adopted, defendants who are 
unreasonably unaware of alternatives should perhaps be guilty only of negligence, even if they knew 
what they were doing and ac ted intentionally. Cf MODEL P ENAL CODE § 3.09(2) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962) (no justifica tion for reckless or negligent use of otherwise justifiable force if cr im e was 
one of recklessness or negligence). Support for the subjective approach consists of the familiar con-
tention that c riminal liability should be based on a subjective standard in most cases. 
23. Weighing the pain balance and assessing motivation will be problema tic processes requ ir-
ing impressionistic judgments based on the actor's past history and what we know of the ac tor's 
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The criteria I have offered for compulsion comport with our moral 
intuitions and practices. If a choice is too hard, it is unfair to blame and 
punish the actor who has no reasonable alternative. This is not to say 
that the actor has no choice. 24 Saintly persons might be willing to un-
dergo any pain rather than harm another, but the criminal law cann ot 
expect such sa intl y behavior from ordinary persons. In addition, possibl e 
future criminal punishment will have little deterrent effect on a person 
faced with the immediate and severe pain of making the "right" choice in 
a hard-choice situatio n. 
How much irrationality and compulsion are necessary for moral and 
legal excuse? The degree of rationality or self-control that may be in-
volved in a specific act is rarely an all-or-none matter, and these factors 
may vary in deg ree over time during one's life. Similarly, the degree of 
rationality or self-control that soc iety and the law require for responsibil-
ity may vary over time within a society and among societies. One need 
not be totally irrational or compelled to be excused, but at various times 
and in various places more o r less may generally be expected from 
people. 
The most important point to recognize, however, is .that mental 
health science cannot set the legal standard for irrationality or compul-
sion in the context of legal accountability because setting the standard is 
not a scientific issue. The standard is a moral and social standard, to be 
set by those legal institutions empowered by a society to make individual 
moral and social decisions. In our society, for example, the substantive 
standards for legal insanity should be set largely by the legislature and 
interpreted by the courts, and individual cases should be decided by ju-
ries and judges. 
The criteria for lack of responsibility also include the requirement 
that the irrationality or compulsion must be nonculpable. In other 
words, the actor should not be excused if the irrationality or compulsion 
was the result of the person's rational, voluntary act. If the irrationality 
is produced by the voluntary and knowing ingestion of a hallucinogen, 
for example, the actor is entirely responsible for the subsequent irration-
psychological and physical make-up. See Audi, supra note 17, a t 12. There is no subst itute for such 
judgments that will be less impressionis ti c, however , o r less so than ma ny other legal judgments. 
Furthermore, the difficulty in making th ese judgments does not necessitate the conclusion that they 
will require expert co nclusions. Experts can provide behavioral data, but weighing the pain balance 
and assessing motivation require only common sense inferences from such data. 
24. The Frenc h d is tinguish between physical compulsion and mora l compulsion to capture 
precisely this differe nce. G. fLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 803 n.S (19 78). 
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ality and will therefore not be excusedY Similarly, a mentally disor-
dered person who is able to control the disorder or its effects will be held 
responsible if such a person could have taken medicine, exercised will-
power, or whatever. 26 
The insanity defense issue, then , is whether in some cases extreme 
craziness (involved in the defendant 's offensive conduct) so compromises 
the defendant 's rationality or creates such compulsion that it would be 
unjust to hold the defendant responsible. Whatever skepticism exists 
about the scientific status of psychiat ry and psychology, it is clear that a 
small number of persons commit offenses under the influence of ex-
tremely crazy states of mind Y Even resolute opponents of the insanity 
defen se, such as Norval Morris, admit that there "is indeed some quite 
florid psychopathology [i.e., crazy behavior] ... among those for whom 
these pleas are made."28 The law should mitigate the punishment of 
such people because, presumably, they are less responsible. These admis-
sions concede that craziness can affect the foundational capacities for re-
sponsibility. In light of such a concession, opponents of the insanity 
defense should have the burden to demonstrate that no mentally disor-
dered defendant should be excused entirely. 
B. CRITICISM OF THE MORAL BASIS OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
Norval Morris has presented the most recent, important, nonconse-
quentialist argument for abolishing the insanity defense in his book, 
Madn ess and the Criminal Law. 29 Professor Morris suggests numerous 
consequentialist arguments for rejecting the insanity defense, but, believ-
ing in desert as a limiting principle in criminal law, he confronts directly 
"the question of fairness, the sense that it is unjust and unfair to stigma-
25. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
26. Note, however, that in these latter cases the actor's cu lpability may be affected although an 
excuse based on irrationality or lack of self-contro l does not obtain. For instance, a hypothet ical 
ac tor who is delusional because of a controllable men tal disorder or the volunta ry in ges tion of a 
hallucinogen, and consequently does not realize the victim killed is a person , cannot be guilty of 
in tentional homicide because the actor lacks the requisite mens rea of intend ing to kill a person. The 
ac tor may be guilty of negligent or even reckless homicide, however, because a reasonable person 
should have been aware, or the actor may in fact have been aware, that the homicidal behavior was 
foreseeable. Again , the lack of culpability in this case is based on the absence of a requ isi te mens rea, 
not 0;1 the presence of the excusin g condi tion of irrati onalit y. 
27. Consider agai n the case of our hypothet ica l, wildly deluded and hallucinating person who 
kills in response to the delusional belief, buttressed by nonexistent voices, that there is a murderous 
plot against him. 
28. N. MORRIS, supra note 3, a t 83. 
29. N. MORRIS, supra note 3. 
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tize the mentally ill as criminals and to punish them for their crimes. " 30 
Professor Morris denies that the mentally disordered lack the capacity to 
choose their behavior. 31 In brief, he argues that other causes, such as 
social disadvantage, are far more criminogenic than mental disorder (in-
cluding severe disorder), yet we do not excuse those who are poor or the 
products of broken homes. Professor Morris concludes, "[a]s a rational 
matter it is hard to see why one should be more responsibl e for what is 
done to one tha:~ for what one is." 32 This conclusion is surely correct. It 
does not follow from the argument presented for it , however, which 
makes a morally irrelevant comparison between the poor and the men-
tally disordered. 
Professor Morris confuses causation with excuse, a confusion that 
has consistently bedeviled criminal law theorists. Causation is not an ex-
cuse, however, for all behavior is caused. If causation were an excuse, no 
one would be held responsible for any behavior, criminal or not. 33 More-
over, causation is not the equivalent of the subspecies of excuse that we 
term compulsion. 34 Compulsion exists when the person faces a regretta-
ble hard choice that leaves one with no reasonable alternative to wrong-
doing. 35 Again, if causation were the equivalent of compulsion, no one 
would be responsible because all would be compelled. Causation is not 
the issue; nonculpable lack of rationality and compulsion is. Understood 
in these terms, Professor Morris' conclusion that a person should not be 
more responsible for what is done to one than for what one is does indeed 
30. !d. at 61. 
J i. Professor Morris uses the locutions " freedom of cho ice" and ' 'absence o f choice" to char-
ac terize the criteria for respo nsibility and nonresponsibility. !d. I believe tha t these locutions a nd 
related term s such as free will and determinism are entirely co nfusing in the legal and psychia tri c 
literature. See H. fiNGARETT E, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 71-81 ( 1972). Rather th a n 
being the c rite ri a for responsibility , they are typi cally used as conclusory sy nony ms for responsibil-
ity. For instance, what does it mean to say that a person lacks free will? If it means tha t the pe rson's 
behavior is unca used , then it is conceptually confused and mo ra ll y irrelevant. In a causal uni verse, 
all phenom ena, including beha viors, are caused. If free will m ea ns that the perso n is not compelled, 
then it is a reasonable synonym for one criterion of responsibility- as long as compulsion is not 
simply the equivalent of "caused." In any case, terms such as free will are no toriously obscure. 
Writers should try to desc ri be the behavioral criteria for respo ns ibility rather than using conclusory , 
metaphysica l te rms. These iss ues are discussed infra in the text accompanying no tes 33-34. 
32. N. MORRIS, supra note 3, at 63. Professor Morris also ma kes a number o f practical a rg u· 
ments abo ut the defense, but the heart of his moral argument is presented in the text. 
33. M oore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CALIF. L. R EV. (forthcoming 1985) (copy o n fil e 
with Southern California L aw R eview); Morse, Psychology. Determinism. and L egal Responsibility, in 
33 D NEBR AS KA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION (G. Melton ed. fo rthco ming 1986) (co py on fil e with 
the Sourhern California Law Review). See generally L. DAVIS, THEORY Of' ACTION 107-41 (1979). 
34. Grunbaum, Free Will and Laws of Human Behavior, in N Ew READIN GS IN PHILOSOPHI-
CAL ANALYSIS 605, 610-12 (H. Feigl, W. Sellars & K. Lehrer eds. 1972). 
35. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22. 
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follow. These are not the terms in which he makes his argument, 
however. 
Consider the case of a person whose extreme irrationality stems 
from the involuntary ingestion of a powerful hallucinogen. Such a de-
fendant, who is not responsible for the ingestion of the drug, is not held 
responsible for a consequent crime. 36 How can we distinguish this case 
from that of a person who commits a crime in response to motivations 
produced by severe mental disorder, say, a sudden command hallucina-
tion buttressed by a consistent delusional belief that the action is neces-
sary?37 Crazy defendants who are not responsible for what they are 
should also be excused. In both cases the defendant is excused not be-
cause the behavior was caused-all behavior is caused-but because the 
defendant was sufficiently irrational and was not responsible for the 
irrationality. 
The reason we do not excuse most disadvantaged criminals (or those 
whose criminal behavior can be explained by powerful causes) is not be-
cause we lack sympathy for their unfortunate background or because we 
fail to recognize that social disadvantage is a powerful cause of crime, as 
it surely is. 38 Rather, most disadvantaged defendants are held responsible 
because they possess minimal rationality and are not compelled to offend. 
A disadvantaged defendant driven sufficiently crazy by circumstances 
will be excused because that defendant is crazy, not because the crazy 
behavior is caused and the defendant is disadvantaged. Similarly, most 
mentally disordered persons are held responsible for acts influenced by 
their disorders because they are sufficiently rational to meet the low 
threshold standards for responsibility. 39 In sum, the criteria for moral 
autonomy and responsibility are rationality and lack of compulsion, 
whereas the criterion for excuse is that the actor is nonculpably lacking 
either reasonable rationality or is compelled. 
The other major recent attack on the insanity defense, the American 
Medical Association's (AMA) report recommending abolition of the 
"special" defense of insanity,40 provides another instructive but confused 
counterargument to the defense's moral basis. The AMA's most impor-
36. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.08( 4)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
37. Assume that the actor was unable to take any advance steps to control the craziness, such 
as taking prescribed medication. 
38. Cantwell, The Offender, in BuREAU OF JusTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JusTICE, RE-
PORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 29, 36-38 (1983). 
39. Morse, supra note 3, at 560-90. 
40. Board of Trustees, Insanity Defense in Criminal Trials and Llmitarions of Psychiarric Tesri-
mony, 251 J. A.M.A. 2967 (1984) [hereinafter cited as AMA REPORT]. 
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tant argument is that the insanity defense undermines the moral integ ri ty 
of the criminal law because it impermissibly confuses psychiatric and 
legal concepts .41 The AMA writes: 
A defense premised on psychiatric models represents a singularly 
un satisfacto ry , and inheren tl y comradicto ry approach to the issue of 
accountab ili ty ... 
The essential goa l of an exculpato ry test fo r in sanity is to identify 
the point a t which a defendan t's m ental co nditi on has beco me so im-
paired th at society may confidently conclude that he has lost his free 
will. . .. Because free will is an article of faith , rather tha n a concept 
that can be explained in medical term s, it is im possible for psychiatrists 
to determine whether a mental impairment has affected the defendant' s 
capacity for voluntary choice, or caused him to commit the particular 
act in ques tion. Accordingly, since models of mental illness a re in-
determinant in this respect, they can provide no reliable measure of 
responsibility. 42 
R ather than being a persuasive argument against the moral basis of the 
defense, this quote exhibits a confusion about moral responsibility akin to 
Professor Morris ' equation of causation with excuse. The AMA believes 
that the insanity defense confuses moral and legal concepts with medical 
concepts, but it is the AMA analysis that is guilty of this confusion. 
The legal defense of insanity is not based on the psychiatric premise 
of determinism, and the essential goal of the defense is not to identify 
those actors who lack free will. The legal defense of insanity is based on 
the premise that rationality and lack of compulsion are the touchstones 
of moral responsibility , and the various tests seek to identify those actors 
who lack these at tributes. The AMA correctly notes that free will can-
not be explained in medical terms or identified medically, but this is en-
tirely beside the point. Medical models cannot provide a "reliable 
measure of responsibility" because they are not meant to do so. The 
AMA errs by clai ming that free will is the basis for responsibility43 and 
that mental disorder is somehow necessarily the antithesis of free will. 
Free will is not the basi s for responsibility, and mental disorder per se 
does not negate responsibility: irrationality or compulsion negate re-
sponsibility. Experts cannot help the factfinder decide if a defendant 
lacked free will, but they can provide behavioral evidence to help deter-
mine if the defendant was irrational or compelled. The AMA's confused 
argument entirely fail s to undercut the moral basis for the insanity de-
41. !d. at 2977 -78. 
42 . !d. at 2978. 
43 . H. FINGA RETTE, supra note 3 1, at 71-81. 
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fense because it does not recognize and deal with the true criteria for 
excuse. 44 
To buttress its argument, the AMA considers the case of the wildly 
deluded criminal who possesses full mens rea and concludes, in contrast 
to cases involving other defenses such as duress, that " [n]o clear counter-
vailing benefit accrues to society as a consequence of the exoneration of 
one who intentionally kill s another as a result of an insane delusion. " 4 5 
But what countervailing benefit exists in the use of duress, for example? 
If duress were not available as an excuse, would not all threatened actors 
have the greatest incentive to resist doing harm? Further, the impact of 
the threats on culpability could be considered at sentencing, much as the 
AMA is willing to consider mental disorder at sentencing. Yet the law 
retains a limited defense of duress because it is simply unjust to blame an 
actor whose harmful act was caused by overwhelming threats. Such an 
actor is not culpable and does not deserve to be punished. The same is 
true in some cases of mental disorder: fundamentally irrational 
harmdoers are not morally accountable. 
In order to deal with cases of fundamental irrationality, the AMA 
admits that a "formal doctrine" of mitigation such as the Model Penal 
Code's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance doctrine"46 may be 
necessary. 47 This doctrine is not a technical mens rea element, however, 
but is rather a form of partial insanity.4 8 Even the AMA recognizes the 
possible moral need for a mini-insanity defense. If such a mini-defense is 
necessary, a full defense is also necessary in appropriate cases. Although 
it is possible that critics of the insanity defense such as Professor Morris 
and the AMA might concede that craziness can diminish responsibility 
somewhat, but never totally, it is difficult to imagine, and the critics do 
not provide, any moral argument that would support holding responsible 
a defendant who was wildly out of touch with reality at the time of the 
offense. 
Finally, some critics claim that the moral argument for the insanity 
defense overstates the moral bases of criminal law. The AMA, for exam-
44. Moreover, the AMA admits the relevance of mental d isorder to responsibility by consider-
ing disorder "a circumstance germ ane to the degree of res ponsibi lity." AMA REPORT, supra note 
40, at 2978. If responsibility is a matter of degree, however, there will be cases in which it is lackin g 
a lt ogether. Is it just to blame and pu nish such persons, few though they be? 
45 . !d. at 2979 . 
46. MoDEL PENAL CoDE§ 2 10.3(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
47. AMA REPO RT, supra note 40, a t 2979. 
48. Morse, Undim inished Confusion in Diminished Capacity , 75 J. CR IM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1, 22-24 ( 1984). 
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pie, begins its counterargument with this dubious and vague generaliza-
tion: "Proponents of the insanity defense overemphasize the degree to 
which modern criminal law rests upon traditional moral imperatives."49 
Modern criminal law rests on mixed consequentialist and nonconsequen-
tialist justifications, but this is hardly an argument for abolishing a fun-
damentally just doct rine. As long as the criminal law does have moral 
foundations-and these are surely far stronger than the AMA implies-
core notions of blameworthiness cannot be abandoned in ascribing gu ilt 
and apportioning punishment. Moreover, to support its vague and mis-
lead ing generalization, the AMA misinterprets the evolution of mens rea 
by asserting that it is based on consequentialist concerns: 
As the law evolved, the requisite mental elements of the various felo-
nies developed along divergent lines to meet exigencies and social 
needs that varied with each felony . Thus, mens rea came to acquire a 
technical significance-it is less indicative of a mind bent on evildoing 
than an intent to do that which unduly endangers social or public in-
terests . An insanity defense justified solely or primarily on moral 
grounds is an anachronism in the modern scheme of criminal 
administration. 50 
Differences in criminal liability based on differences in mens rea reflect 
consequentialist concerns-the actor's dangerousness and need for inca-
pacitation-but they also and equally reflect moral culpability concerns. 
Intentional killers are punished more harshly than negligent killers not 
only because they are more dangerous-indeed, they may not be-but 
also because they are considered more heinous. As the California 
Supreme Court wrote in discussing the degrees of homicide, the differ-
ence among degrees lies in the "personal turpitude" of the offender. 51 If 
the AMA were correct, there should not be degrees of any crime. A de-
fendant who causes proscribed harms with any culpable mens rea should 
be convicted of the unified crime, and the social tinkerers would then 
take account of consequential concerns at sentencing. The AMA's anal-
ysis of mens rea does not support its claim that the arguments for the 
moral bases of the insanity defense fail. Proponents of the insanity de-
fense need not overstate the moral foundations of the criminal law to 
press the moral claim for the defense. 
Under my view of responsibility, a critic of the insanity defense must 
show either (1) that the defense is never justified on fairness grounds 
because no disordered defendant is ever sufficien tly nonculpably irra-
49. AMA REPORT, supra note 40, at 2977. 
50. Jd. 
51. People v. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d 795, 820, 394 P.2d 959 , 974, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271, 286 ( 1964). 
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tiona! or compelled to be excused entirely, or (2) that, even if some de-
fendants are sufficiently irrational or compelled, they are all responsible 
for their failure to prevent these conditions or their consequences. These 
showings, I submit, have not been and cannot be made. If I am correct, 
the fairness argument for abolition of the insanity defense fails. It is sim -
ply not just to convict a nd exact retributive punishment from those who 
are fundam entally and nonculpably irrational or compelled .52 A lthough 
a st rong argument can be made that even the craziest persons retain a 
substantial degree of ability to control their craziness or other related 
behavior and thus could be held accountable for their actions, in the 
c riminal justice system, where liberty and stigma are at stake, the benefit 
of the doubt on this issue should be given to the very crazy by retaining 
the insanity defense. 53 
Despite the strong moral argument in favor of the insanity defense, 
many still wish to abolish it because its administration is so unsatisfac-
tory: 54 it fails to identify accurately those who should be excused (i.e., it 
often does not succeed when it should and vice versa); 55 it deflects con-
cern from the plight of the many jail and prison inmates who are disor-
dered and need treatment; the atmosphere of insanity defense trials is 
often circus-like; truly decent treatment for acquittees is rarely provided; 
and so on. These problems and others lead some critics to believe that 
the moral necessity of retaining the defense is only an ivory-tower notion 
that is divorced from the inadequacies of the criminal justice system, 
52. One can a lso argue for retenti on of the insanity defense based on the traditional nonrctribu -
tive goals of the criminal justice sys tem. People incapable of behaving rationally or controlling 
themselves cannot be deterred. The general deterrent and educative effec ts of the criminal law arc 
not vitiated by excusing the few persons who are sufficiently irrational or lacking in self-contro l. 
because the rest of us understand that crazy people are fundamentally different in a morally releva nt 
way and should therefore be treated differently. Indeed , the morality and force of the criminal law 
are bolstered if a few und en iab ly crazy persons who do not deserve punishment are excused. If 
persons acquitted by reason of insanity arc dangerous, they can bi! incapacitated by means other than 
a c riminal sentence served in prison. Fina ll y, to the extent that reha bilitation is a proper goal of the 
criminal justice sys tem-and the re are man y, including Professor Morris a nd me, who d o ubt this-
this object ive too can be achieved in a nonpena l environment. See N. MORRIS, THE FuTURE OF 
IMPRISONMENT 1-27 ( 1974). 
53. For the same reasons, I a rgue by contrast that involuntary civ il commitment of the men-
tally disordered should be abolished. Morse. A Pre/ere nee for Liberty: The Case Against Involuntary 
Commit men! of rhe Menrally Disordered, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 54, passim ( 1982). 
54. See generally MYTHS AND REALITIES : A REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE IN-
SANITY DEFENSE 14-27 (19 83) (administration of insanity defense is unsatisfactory, but it should be 
retained and reformed) (hereinafter cited as MYTHS AND REALITIES]. 
55. E.g., N. MoRRIS, supra note 3, at 63-64. There is no hard evidence to prove this , although 
it is the claim of man y. This claim is often made because the c la imant assumes explicitly or implicitly 
that mos t mentall y disordered crimina ls are legally insa ne or that the purpose of the in sanity defense 
is o r should be treatme nt. 
J 
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from the ambivalence with which society views crazy criminals, and 
from the consequent vengeance and neglect so often visited on those who 
are acquitted by reason of insanity. 56 Such critics believe that it is more 
immoral to retain the defense than to abandon it because administration 
of the insanity defense is and must be itself immoral. 
The abolitionist sentiment that admits the moral bases for the de-
fense but despairs of its ever being properly employed is understandable 
but must be resisted. Aboli shing the insanity defense will not measurably 
improve the efficiency and honesty of the criminal justice system, nor \Viii 
it lead to enhanced social safety. Rather, it is an admission of moral 
exhaustion that will lead to further disrespect for the notion that persons 
must be treated seriously as moral agents. Only by recognizing that 
there are limits to moral agency can our society remain clear about what 
it means to be responsible for one's actions. The energy used to promote 
abolition should be rechanneled into reform. No set of reforms will 
probably ever be completely successful in this area because of our mixed 
feelings about crazy criminals. But if the moral integrity of the criminal 
law is to be protected, the insanity defense must be retained. 
II. INSUBSTANTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 
There are a number of objections to the insanity defense that I be-
lieve are insubstantial. That is, either they are based on false empirical 
assumptions and incorrect logic or they prove too much and thus fail to 
provide objections specific to the insanity defense. These objections are 
raised frequently, however, and their proponents believe they have force, 
so they must be addressed. These objections to the insanity defense, 
which I shall discuss in order, are: (1) it produces "wrong" verdicts; (2) 
defendants use it to "beat the rap" ; (3) it deflects attention and resources 
from the treatment needs of the disordered persons in jail and prison who 
did not raise or failed with the defense; (4) it is a historical accident; (5) it 
is a "rich person's defense" ; (6) it is used too infrequently to justify re-
taining it; and (7) it requires an assessment of the defendant's past mental 
state, a task that is too difficult. 
A. THE INSANITY DEFENSE PRODUCES "WRONG" VERDICTS 
Unlike many other criteria fo_r criminal liability, the insanity defense 
tests do not raise strictly factual questions. Rather, the judgment made 
56. Jd. at 63-64, 72-74. 
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about the defendant's mental state at the time of the crime is primarily a 
legal, moral, and social judgment. For example, whether the defendant 
fired the fatal bullet and intended to kill the victim, thus satisfying the 
elements of murder, are fac tual questions with determinate, albeit often 
difficult to determine, answers. By contrast, the insanity defense tes ts ask 
indeterminate questions, such as how much lack of knowledge of righ t 
and wrong or how much lack of capacity to conform one's conduct to the 
law a defendant must have in order to be acquitted. Of course, the lega l 
judgment must be based on facts, but the legal test is not itself factual. 
The insanity defense tests prescribe the relevant behavioral continuum, 
but drawing the line between guilt and innocence is the task of the 
factfinder as the moral representative of the community. Except a t the 
extremes, there are rarely dete rminate answers to such moral questions. 57 
If there is no substantial error in the presentation of the evidence or 
the instructions to the jury, most insanity verdicts are presumptively rea-
sonable. 58 The question is one of applying community standards in light 
of legal precedents and there are few determinate, objectively correct, 
clear cases that reach the jury. The factfinder may be swayed by preju-
dice, or may willfully refuse to apply the test properly in the rare clear 
case, but this is possible with all indeterminate, morally-based criteria, 
and there is no reason to believe it happens disproportionately often in 
insanity defense cases. Moreover, even if it could be said that an insanity 
verdict is wrong in some ultimate, objective sense, "wrong" verdicts are 
possible in all areas of law, but they do not always lead to intemperate 
attempts to change fundamentally just laws. For instance, juries must 
occasionally acquit defendants claiming the indeterminate justification of 
self-defense because jurors wrongly accept the defendants' false claims 
that they honestly and reasonably believed their lives were in danger, yet 
no one consequently calls for the abolition of self-defense as a defense. 
Furthermore, even if insanity defense verdicts can be objectively wrong, 
again there is no reason to believe this occurs disproportionately often 
with this particular defense. The wrong or unpopular verdict argument 
is far too weak conceptually and proves far too much to be a legitimate 
reason for abolishing the insanity defense. 
57. Of course, the insa nity defense is not the only indeterminate criminal law criterion th a t 
must be adjudicated in light of the comm unity's moral and social values. Questions of causation and 
"reasonableness" are similarly indeterminate. 
58. Another poss ibility is that jurors do not understa nd insanity defense instructions, but these 
instructions are surely no more incomprehensible than inst ructions o n a hos t of other issues. See 
generally Sales, Elwork & Alfini , Improving Comprehension for Ju ry Instructions, in I PERSPECTIVES 
IN L AW AND PSYCHOLOGY: THE CR IMI NA L JUSTICE SYSTEM 23 (D. Sales ed. 1977) (jury incom-
prehension is often due to ling uisti c difficulties inherent in jury ins tructions). 
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B. INSANITY DEFENDA NTS "B EAT THE RAP" 
Few defendants "beat the rap" with the insanity defense. There are 
little hard da ta for this claim, but it is best es timated that the insanity 
defense is raised in fewer than two percent of federal and state trials and 
is rarely successful. 59 The complaint that thi s defense allows la rge num-
bers of criminals to avoid conviction and punishment is simply un-
founded.60 Prosecutors and defense attorneys generally recognize that 
insanity is a defense of last resort that betokens an otherwise weak de-
fense and that rarely succeeds. Even those jurisdictions with the 
broadest insanity defenses do not have a substantial number of acquittals. 
Insanity acquittals are far too infrequent to communicate the message 
that the criminal justice system is "soft'' or fails to protect society. 61 It is 
impossible to measure precisely the symbolic value of these acquittals, 
but it is also hard to believe that they have much impact on social or 
individual perceptions. So few insanity pleas succeed that neither aspir-
ing criminals nor society assume that conviction and punishment will be 
averted by raising the defense. 
C. THE INSANITY DEFENSE DEFLECTS ATTENTION FROM THE 
NEEDS OF DISORDERED JAIL AND PRISON INMATES 
I do not believe that the existence of the insanity defense deflects 
attention from the condition and the needs of the many disordered per-
sons in jail and prison who do not rai se or fail with the defense .62 Mental 
health (and other medical) services in jails and prisons are admittedly 
59. MYTHS AN D R EA LITIES, supra note 54, at 14-15; P asewa rk, ln sanily Pleas: A Review of the 
R esearch Litera/Ure, 91. PSYC HIATRY & LAW 357, 36 1-66 (1981). In G reat Bri ta in, the use of the 
insanity defense has been ca lled "virtually obso lete." S. D ELL, MURDER INTO MANSLAUGHTER 53 
(19 84). This has occurred primarily because of both the diffi culties in proving insanity and the inflex-
ibl y harsh dispositional consequences th at ensue if the defendant succeeds with the pl ea. 
60. Pasewark, supra note 59, a t 36 1-66. Indeed , one might eve n a rgue tha t, a lthough few de-
fend ants deserve an excuse on the ground of insanity, actua lly too few insanity defenses succeed 
because jurors fear those who commit particularly heinous acts or distrust the insanity defense. On 
the o ther hand , clear cases in which the defense is undeniably jus tified rarely go to trial. Instead , the 
prosecution accedes to the insanity plea prior to trial, and com mitment ensues. MYTHS AND R EA LI-
TIES, supra note 54, at 23-24. 
61. SeeS. DELL, supra note 59; MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 54; Pasewark, supra note 
59. 
62. The prevalence rate of psychosis is the same for inmate and class-matched community 
popula tions; there is no consistent evidence that the prevalence of nonpsychotic disorders differs. 
Monahan & Steadman, Crime and Menta! Disorder: An Epidemiological Approach, in 4 CRIM E AND 
JUSTICE: AN ANN UAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 145, 168-69 (M. T onry & N. M orri s eds. 1983). 
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insufficient to meet the needs of disordered inmates. 63 Nevertheless, it is 
unimaginable that the neglect of this population stems in whole or in 
substantial part from the existence of the insanity defense and the atten-
tion it receives. Substandard and too often inhumane jail and prison con-
ditions exist because society believes that criminals deserve fewer 
resources than other claimants. Providing decent mental health services 
to inmates will require a legislative act of political will that will itself 
depend on massive transformations of legislative attitudes towards pris-
oners. I believe it is cynical or naive to suggest that abolition of the in-
sanity defense will have any appreciable effect on jail and prison services. 
Indeed, if abolition has any effect at all, it may be the opposite: without 
the insanity defense, the plight of disordered persons in the criminal jus-
tice system may become even less visible than it is today. 64 Furthermore, 
legislatures may think it unnecessary to provide substantial mental 
health services to those who are justly held responsible, as would always 
be the case if the insanity defense were abolished. 
D. THE INSANITY DEFENSE IS AN HISTORICAL ACCIDENT 
Some critics try to demonstrate that the insanity defense is an his-
torial accident and thus does not deserve the veneration it receives. 65 
Although I believe the historical evidence supports retention of the de-
fense, its history is irrelevant in determining if the defense is morally 
necessary and practically workable: only moral and practical counter-
arguments can defeat moral and practical arguments for the existence of 
the defense. Our ancestors' beliefs about the defense are not arguments 
either for or against retaining the defense. The place of insanity and its 
manner of adjudication in the past criminal process is not dispositive of 
what its place should be and whether it can be workable today. 
E. INSANITY IS A RICH PERSON'S DEFENSE 
It is also often claimed that insanity is a rich person's defense-the 
Hinckley verdict is a particularly popular example-but this claim 
proves too much. Wealthier defendants can almost always retain the 
63. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JAIL INMATES' MENTAL HEALTH CARE NE-
GLECTED: STATE AND FEDERAL ATTENTION NEEDED passim (1980). 
64. It is also possible that the number of disordered persons in the criminal justice system has 
increased or is increasing because of the decreased use of mental hospitalization. Teplin, The 
Criminalization of the .Mentally Ill: Speculation in Search of Data, 94 PsYCHOLOGICAL BULL. 54, 
55-64 (1983). 
65. See N. MoRRIS, supra note 3, at 54-59. 
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best attorneys and experts in all types of cases, both civil and criminal. 66 
Although this economic reality may be especially disquieting in the crim-
inal justice system where liberty and stigma are at stake, it is no more 
problematic in insanity defense trials than in other criminal cases. Abol-
ishing the insanity defense would not abolish the inequities of the crimi-
nal justice system admittedl y caused by financial inequality. In any case, 
probably only a few rich defendants raise the insani ty defense, 67 and , as 
noted above, few defendants of any economic status succeed with it. 
Overall, the better solution is sys temic: reasonable attempts must be 
made to ensure all defendants decent representation. All defendants with 
a credible claim for the defense must be given a reasonable opportunity 
to pursue the defense properly by providing them with qualified experts 
and other necessary resources. 6 8 Insanity defense cases can be expensive, 
but these costs should not be prohibitive if the number of defendants who 
raise the defense is small. This result depends, of course, on refining the 
test for insanity so that it is limited to those few defendants who might 
fairly be excused. Of course, if the test adopted were broad, a large 
number of defendants might try to raise the defense and the costs of adju-
dication would consequently rise substantially. If the defense is morally 
required, however, society must be willing to bear the costs of its fair 
adjudication. 
F. THE I NSANITY DEFENSE IS RAISED Too JNFREQUENTL Y TO BE 
WORTH THE TROUBLE 
One might argue that the insanity defense is raised too infrequently 
to be worth the trouble it causes. But other defenses such as duress and 
necessity are also raised infrequently and are also difficult to "adjudi-
cate." If a defense is morally required then it should be retained, even if 
only a few defendants qualify for it. Because it is unfair to punish those 
who are legally insane, society should bear the cost of avoiding such 
injustice. 
66. In contras t, H enry Steadman 's study on competence to stand trial in N ew York State 
found that public defenders, who were more ex perienced in handling such matters , represen ted de-
fendants better than did higher priced , private a tto rneys. H. STEADMAN, BEATING A R AP?: DE-
FENDANTS FOUND INCOM PETENT TO STAND TRIAL 49-50 (1 979). One wonders if this might no t be 
true of the insanity defense as well, except, perh aps, in the case of those few private criminal defense 
attorneys who have substantial experience with the defense. 
67 . H awkins & Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing the Insanity Plea, 53 PSYCHO-
LOGICA L REP. 19 1, 194 (1983); Pasewark, supra note 59, at 368-69. 
68. The Supreme Court has decided that the state cannot refuse to provide an indigent defend-
an t who raised the insanity defense with a psychia tric repo rt to help him prepare his defense and 
claims for mitigation in sentencing. Ake v. Oklahoma, 53 U.S. L.W. 4179, 418 3 ( 1985). 
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G. PAST MENTAL STATES CANNOT BE DETERMINED 
Some critics argue that the insanity defense is unworkable because 
neither experts nor laypersons can reconstruct the defendant's mental 
state at the time of the crime; it is too hard to enter the mind of another, 
especially when considering past events. 69 Consequently the usual pre-
scription is to consider the defendant's mental disorder only at the time 
of sentencing. This argument proves too much. If these critics concede, 
as almost all do, the necessity of proving mens rea (for most crimes) 
before punishment may justly be imposed, then their argument against 
the insanity defense must fail unless assessing past intent, knowledge, and 
other types of mens rea is easier than assessing past craziness. After all, 
both mens rea and legal insanity refer to past mental states that must be 
inferred from the defendant's actions, including utterances. Indeed, one 
could claim that the extreme craziness that I deem necessary to support 
an insanity defense is easier to prove than ordinary mens rea because it is, 
by definition, obvious. Moreoever, if sentencing is based in part on de-
sert, then the defendant's responsibility, based on mental state at the time 
of the crime, must be assessed. 70 
Some abolitionist critics take their arguments about proving mens 
rea to even greater extremes. They lament the criminal law's concern 
with mens rea as well as with legal insanity. For them, the law should 
take account only of the defendant's dangerousness and our ability to 
train, treat, or educate persons to behave properly in the future. 71 With 
all due respect, these radical critics are confused. Although it is admit-
tedly difficult to determine the mental state of another, it is nevertheless 
utterly necessary to make moral judgments about the actor. Both the 
law and lay judgments individuate an actor's culpability according to the 
mental states that accompany actions. In moral terms, there is an im-
mense difference between inflicting an injury intentionally and inflicting 
it by accident. Any parent disciplining a child knows that deeds commit-
ted "on purpose" and those committed by mistake require different pa-
69. See H. FINGAREITE, supra note 31, at 81-84; W. WINSLADE & J. Ross, THE INSANITY 
PLEA 8-12 (1983). 
70. One of the amusing inconsistencies among opponents of psychiatric excuses is the conflict 
about whether it is harder to prove insanity or the negation of mens rea. Those who wish to avoid 
the use of psychiatric testimony to negate mens rea claim that it is much harder to prove mens rea 
negation than insanity. Critics of the insanity defense claim the opposite, of course. The truth is 
that they are equally easy (or difficult) to prove, but, if there is any difference, it is probably some-
what easier to adjudicate insanity. In any event, since fundamental fairness requires that the defend-
ant be allowed to try to negate mens rea and to raise the insanity defense, the difficulties with 
reconstructing past mental states are simply part of the cost of being fair. 
71. B. WooTTON, supra note 7, at 51-53. 
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rental responses. For the same reason, actors who commit cnmes 
intentionally are considered more culpable and are punished more 
harshly than those who cause the same harms recklessly or negligently. 
Unless one wishes the law to stop treating persons as persons-as beings 
deserving of praise and blame-and wishes the law, instead, to treat them 
as machines th at need on ly be adjusted, criticism of the law's assessment 
of mental sta tes is misguid ed . Even if such a dehumanizing scheme were 
coherent and workable, however, this is not the theory of criminal justice 
that the opponents of the insanity defense adopt. 
III. ALTERNATIVES TO ABOLISHING THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 
Some critics concede the moral point that legal recognition of crazi-
ness is important, but believe that this can be accomplished without 
maintaining a separate defense of insanity. In this Part of the Article, I 
argue that the primary suggestions for accomplishing this goal-the " ele-
ments" (m ens rea) approach, sentencing discretion, and the guilty but 
mentally ill verdict (GBMI)-are misguided. Finally, I suggest that abo-
lition is probably constitutional today, but should not be. 
A. THE "ELEMENTS" APPROACH 
Those who believe that responsibility can be considered primarily 
within the confines of the state's prima facie case argue that volitional 
and cognitive consequences of mental disorder can fairly be handled by 
the actus reus and m ens rea doctrines. This ignores the true effects of 
mental disorder on behavior, however. As a factual matter, mental dis-
order, even of the extreme variety, rarely negates the requirements of an 
act and appropriate mental state. 72 Disordered persons are not auto-
matons. Unlike sleepwalkers or persons acting reflexively who lack the 
actus reus for the crime, disordered persons' acts are willed even if they 
are the result of crazy reasons or compulsion. Moreover, virtually all 
crazy persons know, in the strictest sense, what they are doing and intend 
72. There are no hard data wi th which to prove this claim. Rather, my experience as a consult-
ant and my exam in ation of th e reported cases lead to the conclusion that the statement is accurate. I 
have discussed the iss ues in detail elsewhere. Morse, supra note 48, at 40-42. One of the rare excep-
tions that proves the rule is People v. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P. 2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 
(1978), in wh ich a diso rdered defendant charged with burglary cla imed tha t he believed he had 
broken into his own apa rtment. If he was not shamming-and I believe there is considerable reason 
to believe that he was-the defendant lacked th e mens rea for burgla ry: he did not intend unlawfully 
to enter the dwelling of another or to commit a fe lony (e.g., theft--depriving another permanently of 
property) therein. 
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to do it. A person who kills another because of a delusional belief is 
aware of killing a human being and does so intentionally. If such a per-
son is to be acquitted, it must be because of an excuse, not because the 
state has no prima faci e case. Crazy defendants rarely if ever lack m ens 
rea because they believe (to use the Model Penal Code's silly example) 
that they are squeezing a lemon rather than killing a person. 73 
Other doctrines of excuse or justificat ion such as duress, mistake, or 
self-d efense will not help either. These excuses will typ ically be irrele-
vant , or, if relevant , will succeed only if acted on reasonably. 74 For in-
stance, the traditional excuse of duress will not be available to a 
defendant who killed another acting upon a delusional belief because 
there is no threat by another person. Mistake, too, will typically be irrel-
evant because the type of mistake produced by mental disorder usually 
involves the defendant's motive instead of negating mens rea. Finally, 
where the crazy person's belief is relevant, it is, by definition, unreasona-
ble. Moreover, it is not the product of negligence, but rather of appar-
ently uncontrollable, albeit largely unidentified, factors. In most cases, 
the actus reus and m ens rea doctrines and defenses other than insanity 
will fail to excuse even the craziest defendant. 
Unless one confuses m ens rea with general responsibility / 5 some 
mentally disordered persons can be treated justly only by a crimina l jus-
tice system that has a defense of insanity. A person who kill s because of 
a delusional belief that to do so will produce peace on earth, kills inten-
tionally and probably premeditatedly and has no defense but insanity to a 
murder charge. Nevertheless, the killing is fundamentally irrational ; the 
person is apparently incapable of behaving rationally in the context in 
which the delusion operates. A person who kills because of the delu-
sional belief that it is necessary to do so to save one's own life kills inten-
tionally and will not succeed with the defense of self-defense. That 
person may be guilty only of negligent or reckless homicide, but such a 
verdict is not responsive to the moral character of the killing. Such a 
person is not properly viewed as a negligent or reckless killer who should 
be convicted of a risk-creation type of homicide, but is rather a crazy 
actor who ought to be excused. The immorality of convicting such per-
sons of some degree of homicide can be avoided only by an insanity de-
73. Mo DEL P ENAL CODE§ 4.01 comment 156 (Tent. Draft No.4, 1955) . 
74. E.g., W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTr, supra note II, at 376 (duress); id. at 393 (se lf-defense). 
75. For the dis tinction be tween " special mens rea" (the defini ti onal menta l elem ents of a crime 
(hat a re part o f the prosecution's prima facie case) and "'gene ra l mens rea" ( respons ibil ity in genera l), 
see S. KADISH, S. SCHU LHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 20, at 267-68. 
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fense and not, as proponents of the elements approach claim, by lenient 
punishment. 
B. SENTENCING DISCRETION 
A related suggest ion for considering mental disorder without retain-
ing the insanity defense-sentencing discretion-also misses the mora! 
point for many of the same reasons already addressed. If a person's cra-
ziness so influences the offense that a complete excuse is appropriate, it 
makes litt le sense to hold the person responsible, to convict the person as 
a morally cu lpable wrongdoer, but then to avoid all penal sanction be-
cause the person does not deserve punishment. 76 Taking account at sen-
tencing of extreme mental disorder that would otherwise excuse entirely 
is sensible only if, first, the insanity defense can justly be abolished be-
cause no defendant should be en tirely excused as a result of the conse-
quences of mental disorder, and, second, one can construct a 
nonarbitrary and reasonable sentencing scheme that reflects the impact 
of mental disorder. The latter is unlikely because we lack coherent princi-
ples finely to calibrate mental disorder to culpability. 77 And, again, once 
it is admitted that mental disorder can affect responsibility for purposes 
of mitigation in sentencing, why is it unacceptable to claim that in some 
cases it can excuse entirely?78 
C. GUlL TY BUT MENTALLY ILL 
Moral and practical considerations also demonstrate the illogic of 
the currently popular and vaunted 79 suggestions for a "guilty but men-
76. Perhaps the most famous analogous example is the notorious British case of su rvival canni-
balism o n the high seas, R egina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 ( 1884). There it was clear that 
the British authorities wished to secure a conviction for murder in order to uphold a principle, but at 
the sanre time wished to insure that the defendants did not suffer severe punishment. A. SIMPSON, 
CANNIBALISM AND THE COMMON LAW: THE STORY OF TH E TRAG IC LAST VOYA GE OF TH E MJ. 
GNONE!!TE AND THE STRANGE LEGAL PROCEEDINGS TO WHICH IT GAVE RISE 79, 195-96, 199-
200, 204 ( 1984). The defenda nts were convicted of murder and sentenced to death as the law re-
quired, id. at 239, but after much con sidera tion the sentence was commuted to six months imprison-
ment , but not at hard labor. !d. a t 240-4 7. 
77. See Morse, Justice, Mercy and Craziness, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1485, 1497-1501 , 1503 -07 
(19 84). 
78. Even the AMA admits that a special defense might be necessary in a few cases and that 
mental di sorder is relevant to sentencing. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
79. E.g .. MI CH. COM P. LAWS ANN.§ 768.36 (West 1982). See generally Note, The Guilty but 
Mentally Ill Verdict and Due Process , 92 YALE L.J. 475 (1983) (arguing that GBMI verdict both 
"lacks protections no rmally associated with the exercise of state power" and implicates several con-
stitutionally derived rights). This verdict is usually adopted in addition to the insanity defense, not 
as a subs titute. 
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tally ill" (GBMI) verdict. If the point of this verdict is to assure that 
persons who are mentall y disordered at the time of conviction receive 
treatment, then it is unobjec tionable, albeit unnecessary. Is the verdict 
"guilty but herpes" sensible or necessary to ensure the medical treatment 
of inmates suffering from herpes? Even without a special verdict, simple 
humanity and the federal Constitution80 require that all prisoners who 
are ill-whether physica ll y or mentally-must receive minimally ade-
quate treatment. A jury verd ict is not th e appropriate means to reach 
diagnoses or to insure trea tmen t. 
If, on the other hand, the purpose of the GBMI verdict is to insure 
punishment of nonrespons ible persons, then it is morally objectionab le. 
Societal concern about re leasing dangerous, disordered defendan ts 
should not be assuaged by convicting those who do not deserve convic-
tion. Rather, persons who were fundam entally crazy at the time of their 
crimes should be acquitted by reason of insanity , and societal safety 
should be insured by rational postacquittal procedures. It makes no 
sense to sentence a crazy defendant to a term based on culpability when 
the defendant is not culpable. If the defendan t is culpable, a simple 
guilty verdict is appropriate. 
Furthermore, the GBMI verdict may encourage jurors who believe 
a defendant is legally insane but who dislike or distrust the insanity de-
fense to compromise on an improper GBMI verdict. They may rational-
ize to themselves that the GBMI defendant will receive treatment, but 
not all GBMI statutes mandate treatment and currently available evi-
dence indicates that GBMI defendants do not rece ive adequate treat-
ment. 81 GBMI thus creates the potential of unfair verdicts without 
yielding dependable benefits, benefits that a rational and humane system 
could provide without it. Finally, if, as some critics claim, the insanity 
defense confuses juries, then, a fortiori, a combination of the insanity 
defense and GBMI will prove even more confusing. And, of course, 
adoption of GBMI to repl ace the insanity defense is unacceptable for the 
reasons given in Part I of this Article. 
D. THE CONSTITUTIO NALITY OF ABOLISHING THE INSANITY 
DEFENSE 
Before addressing the necessary practical reforms of the insanity de-
80. See Youn gberg v. R omeo, 457 U.S. 307,3 15 (1982); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 -05 
( 1976). 
8 1. See Smith & Hall , Evaluating ,Hichigan's Guilty bur Menra//y 1// Verdic t: An Empirical 
Study, 16 U. MICH. J. L. R EF. 77, 104-05 ( 1982). 
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fense, we must consider whether abolition of the insanity defense would 
be constitutional under the due process clause o f the fourt eenth amend-
ment. The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue direc tly and some 
older state cases held that it was not, 82 but the most recent sta te case held 
that abolition of the defense is cons titutionaJ. ~D It is generaliy conceded 
that substantive due process requires the presence of mens rea before 
criminal punishment may be imposed for nonrcgulatory offe nse s;~4 there-
fore, most persons who ass ume abol iti on is unconstitutional be lieve, in-
correctly I think, that insanit y nega tes mens rea. 
Fully analyzing these issues goes far beyond the purpose of this Ar-
ticle, but even a cursory review reveals that aboliton is almost certainly 
constitutional under current federal constitutional doctrine. T he 
Supreme Court has been unwilling to announce a genera l constitutional 
doctrine of responsibility, and thus to require a finding of moral culpabil-
ity before punishment may be imposed. 85 And in Patterson v. N ew 
York, 86 Justice Powell noted in dissent that it would be constitutional for 
a state to abolish the distinction between murder and manslaughter tha t 
is predicated on the provocation/ passion formulaY This distinction is 
one of the oldest in the criminal law, and most would agree that a person 
who kills in the heat of passion on legally adequate provocation is less 
culpable than a person who kills coolly and premeditatedly. 88 Neverthe-
less, obliterating the distinction and convicting all intentional killers of 
the same degree of homicide appears to be within the substantive police 
power of a state. Similarly, although the insanity defense is ancient and 
based on moral principles, its existence as a separate affirmative defense 
appears to be purely a matter of legislative grace and is not compelled by 
due process. 
A powerful argument that it would be unconstitution al to punish a 
fundmentally blameless person for serious crimes could be constructed 
based on the eighth and fourteenth amendments, but I believe that such 
82. E. g .. Sta te v. Strasbu rg, 60 Wash. 106, 110 P.2d 1020 (1910) (legi sla ture denies th e ac-
cused"s constit uti onal right to due process if it denies the opportunity to present evidc:nce of in sani ty 
to the jury). 
83. St a te v. K orell , 690 P.2d 993,998 -1 002 (Mont. 1984). 
84 . See Jeffri es & Stepha n. Defenses, Presumplions and Burden of Proof in 1/r e Criminal Law, 
88 YALE LJ. 1325, 1371-76 (1979). 
85. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 544-46 ( 1968) . 
86. 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
87 . !d. at 228 (Powell , J ., dissenting). I assume that if th e d issen t made th is statement in a case 
tha t was decided " conservat ively," it would not be hard to mu ster a majorit y for the constituti ona l-
it y of this pos ition today . 
88. I do not agree with this, however. See Morse, supra note 48 , at 33-34. 
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an argument, although correct, would fail today. Although it would 
probably be unconstitutional to abolish all mens rea requirements for 
crimes carrying substantial penalties, under current constitutiona l law an 
affirmative defense such as insanity can be abandoned if a state legisla-
ture so decides . Nevertheless, it would be a moral error and a grave 
injusti ce to abo lish the insanity defen se. It ought to be un const ituti onal 
to abolish th e defense, even if the Supreme Court would not so hold 
today. 
IV. REFORMING THE INSANITY DEFENSE 
Although many of the objections to the insanity defense have little 
merit and the alternatives are unacceptable, the curren t substance of and 
complex procedures accompanying the insanity defense do present sub-
stantial problems that must be addressed. Arguing that an insanity de-
fense is morally required does nothing to rebut the criticisms of the 
undoubted abuses o f the defense. I believe these practical objections are 
the real source of discontent. The issues for consideration here are 
whether insanity defense trials can be conducted rationally and whether 
the reasonable safety of society and the proper treatment of the insanity 
acquittee can be accomplished. 
Many claim that the abuses of the insanity defense and its dangers 
to society are inherent and that no amount of reform can ameliorate the 
problems. They conclude that the practical evils of the defense outweigh 
its theoretical justice, and thus the defense should be abolished. I con-
clude, by contrast, that thorough substantive and procedural reforms can 
yield a limited but just insanity defense and that the moral imperative of 
the defen se requires that we attempt reform . The criteria for the defense, 
the role of mental health experts, the burden of persuasion, and postac-
quittal prob lems are the issues requiring attention. 
A. DEVELOPING A R EASONABLE AND WORKABL E T EST FOR LEGAL 
INSANITY 
The insanity defense excuses a defendant who suffers from either a 
cogniti ve or a volitional disability because of mental di sorder. For in-
stance, M'Naghten 89 jurisdictions define legal insanity cognitively: the 
failure to know either right from wrong or the nature of o ne 's ac t. Juri s-
89. D ani el M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 ( 1843). As Richard Moran has conc lusively 
shown, the co rrect spelling of the defendant's name is McN aughtan. R. MOIL\N, KN OW IN G RIGHT 
FROM WRONG: THE INSAN ITY D EFENSE OF DA NIE L MCNAUGHT.-\N xi -xii i ( 1981). To a void con-
fusion, however, I shall use the spellin g of th e official report of the case. 
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dicti ons that also adopt the "irresistible impulse" test additionally define 
legal insanity volitionally: a condition whereby the defendant 's acts are 
caused by an uncontrollable impulse. The American Law Insti tute's 
(ALI) test combin es cognitive and volitional variants of the JV! 'Naghten 
and irresistible impulse tests: does the defendant Jack substantial capac-
ity either to ap preciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of act ions or to 
confo rm conduct to law') We have seen that these tests genera lly track 
the moral bases of responsibility. 90 
The task at hand is to construct a tes t that asks th e right question 
and tha t exc uses only those defendants who are beyond the pale of re-
sponsibility. Whatever the c riteria for responsibility . they cannot be 
quantit a tively and determinately defined. The definition and assessment 
of any degree of rationality and compulsion are too fuzzy and subjective 
to permit even the illusion of precision. The crit eria for responsibility 
should not be amorphous, but neither can they be rigidly specific. No 
matter how tightly the insanity defense is drawn , however, there m ay be 
some "wrong" verdicts-the test will sometimes fail to identify accu-
rately those who ought to be acquitted or convicted_'!' But again, this is 
possible with all criminal defenses. The risk of improper verdicts should 
not cause us to reject a defense that is morally just and that can be writ-
ten so as to minimize this risk. If the test used makes a difference in the 
outcomes of insanity defense trials, 92 the approach suggested here would 
reverse the trend towards broader criteria93 by narrowing the defense 
considerably and reducing the risk of improper verdicts. 9 " 
1. The Definition of }vfental Disorder 
A test fo r legal insanity should not excuse all those who suffer from 
menta l di sorder in general, particular disorders, or mental disorders of 
90 . See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
CJ I See supra text accompa nying notes 57-58. 
92. T here is reason to do ubt tha t it does because som e simu latio n resea rch a nd o ther di rect 
evidence seem 10 indicate thai varying the test used m ay not affect jury ou tcomes. l'asewark, supra 
note 59, al 385-90 (rev iewing all the research literatu re). 
93. This I rend is exemplified by th e legis la t ive or judicial adoption of the broader A LI stan-
da rds in several state and federal courts. See, e. g., VT. STAT. ANN. ti t. 13 §§ 480 1-4802 ( 1958). 
94. Thro ugho ut this Article, I ass ume tha t only a fe w d efend a nt s deserve to be acquitted by 
reason o f insanity a nd that the law sho uld adop t standard s and procedures to satisfy this assumption. 
Th is is. of course. a norma ti ve assumpt io n that re fl ec ts my view that th e standards for responsibil it y 
shou ld be very st r ict a nd that il is fair lo hold most perso ns fu ll y accountable fo r their wro ngdoing. 
Nothing in the genera l moral, socia l, a nd legal anal ys is of thi s Article enta ils tha t assumptio n , ho w-
ever. O ne who accepts my ana lys is of the moral bases o f the insanity d efense might ve ry well be li eve 
t hat th e defense shou ld be mo re generous and that the law sho ul d adop t standa rds and procedures 
conso na n t with th is bel ief. 
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particular severit y. It should excuse only those actors who a re so Irra-
ti onal, so crazy, so out of touch with reality tha t they do not dese rve 
conviction 9 5 The legal test should inform the factfinder, using common 
sense and reasonabl y understandable terms, what beh avior the law has 
identifi ed as su ffici ently crazy to warrant excuse. q6 The terms "mental 
disease or defec t'' do not do thi s: they are too broad and vague to guid e 
the factfind er. 
Some have tri ed to formulate legal definitions for th e terms "mental 
disease or defec t.' ''n I suggest that some such definition sho uld entirely 
replace the mental disease or defect criterion and become the criterion 
itself rather than simply a definition of it. If the legal definition of 
"mental disease or defect" is the functional equivalent of these terms as 
they are used in the insanity defense test-and it is an equivalent by defi-
nition- nothing is lost by my suggestion and much will be gained. I shall 
therefore propose specific language to achieve these goals and suggest the 
virtues of such language. In a spirit of fraternity with the American Psy-
chiatric Association, I shall use, with minor modifications, the definition 
suggested in its Statement on the Insanity Defense. 98 
95. My prefer red tes t would use exac tly language of this type. See infra su bsectio n acco mpa-
nying note 130. 
96. The defendant' s conduct must of course sa tisfy the other elements o f the test as well. 
97. The most famo us a ttempt to provide such a legal definitio n took p b.ce after the Court of 
Appeals fo r the District of Columbi a rend ered its famous decision in Durham v. United Sta tes , 214 
F.2d 862 (D .C. C ir. 1954). Durham held tha t an " accused is not criminally responsible if his unlaw-
ful act was the produc t of men tal disease o r defect." Id. at 874-75. The breadth of the term "menta l 
disease" led to confusion, ho wever, because the court clearly did no t mean to excus.; eve ry defendant 
whose ac t might have been influenced by any menta l disorder. After yea rs of' unfortunate experience 
with Durham 's vague standard, the court o f a ppeals finall y adopted a legal standard in McDonald v. 
Un ited States, 3 12 F.2 d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962) : "[a) mental disease o r defect includes any ab no rmal 
cond iti on of th e mind which subs tantially a ffects mental o r emot iona l processes and substant iall y 
im pairs behav io r contro ls." !d. a t 85 1. Although this formulation looks more prec ise, it is st ill 
vague and tautol ogical a mental disease is a n abnormality that affects the mind, emot ions, o r behav-
ior. Of course, what else could it be? 
1\·l ore recently , the Ame rican Psychi a tric Association has suggested an o ther definition for legal 
purposes that was first proposed by Professor Richard J. Bonnie of the Unive rsity of Virgini a School 
o f Law. AMER ICAN PSYCH IATRIC ASSOC IATION, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFEI'SE 11-12 
( 1982) (ci1ing Bonn ie, A M odel Statute on the Insan ity Defense (1982) (a va il able at Institute of Law, 
Psychiatry and Public Po licy, University of Virginia)) [hereinafter cited as STATEMENT ON TH E 
! NSAI' ITY DEI'E:-JSE]; see Bo nnie, The lvforal Basis of 1he Insanily Defense , 69 A.B.A. J. 194, 197 
(1983). This cleflnition is se t forth and di scussed infra at no tes 98-99 and accompany ing text. 
98. A person charged with a criminal offense should be found not guil ty by reason of 
insa nity if it is shown th a t as a result of me nta l di sease o r menta l reta rda tto n he was unable 
to apprec iate the wrongfulness o f his conduct a t the time of the offense. A s used in this 
stand ard, th e te rms mental disease or m ental retardation inciude only those sc: vere ly abn or-
ma l menta l cond iti o ns that gross ly a nd demonstrably impair a person 's perceptio n or un-
dersta nding of rea lit y and tha t a re not attributable primarily to the vo luntary inges ti on of 
alcoho l or o th er psychoactive substances. 
STATEMENT ON THE l l'SAN ITY D EF ENSE, supra no te 97 , a t 12. 
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The better tes t would be this: 
It is a defense to a prosecution for an offense that, at the tim e of the 
conduct a lleged to const itute the offense, the defendant's pe rcept ion 
and und erstanding of reality was grossly and demonstrably impaired 
and , as a result of that im pairment , the defendant did no t ... [cogn i-
tive and/or volit ional criteri a ). 
809 
The first advantage of thi s definition is that it is an ent irely lega l test 
that uses ordinary descriptive language that can be unders tood by judges 
and jurors. A lthough mental health professionals are concerned in medi-
cal or psychological contexts with gross impairment in rea li ty tes ting, 
there is noth ing necessarily technical about the phrase, " percep ti on and 
understanding of reality was gross ly and demonstrably impaired ." The 
test informs the factfinder directly and without using jargon that th e law 
excuses only those who were really "out of it" at the ti me. A second 
advantage is that the language is unconfusing . Although words like 
"grossly" and " demonstrably" are open to interpretation, and absolute 
precision is unachievable, the proposed test instructs the factfind er that 
the person must be out of touch with reality in a major and obvious way. 
Third, this test obviates the need for the "caveat" paragraph of tests 
such as the ALI formulation , which provides that the men tal diso rder 
c riterion does not include the antisocial personality .99 The antisocial per-
sons contemplated by such caveat language are not out of touch with 
reality and are therefore not included within my proposed definition of 
those who might be excused. Fourth, the proposed test will help reduce 
futile and irrelevant testimony about diagnosi s. The test helps clarify 
that the moral and legal issue is the defendant 's impairment of con tact 
with reality, not the psychological or psychia tric diagnosis of the 
defendant. 
Fifth, and perhaps most importantly, the new test sets the proper 
moral standard for an excuse on the ground of insanity. It would be very 
hard to argue that a person was legally responsible and dese rved to be 
punished if that person's perception and understanding of reality were so 
grossly and demonstrably impaired, that the additional cognitive or voli-
tional requirements of the test were satisfied. Similarly, persons reason-
ably in touch with reality do not deserve to be excused for their heinous 
deeds. Thus, the proposed test correctly identifies the issue and does so 
justly. 
99. MOD EL PENAL CO DE § 4.01(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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2. The Cognitive Test 
Let us next consider the cogmt1ve branch of an insanity defense. 
Although it is difficu lt to determine whether a defendant actua ll y knew 
either the rul es govern ing cond uct or the nature and quality of the act, 
thi s determination is possible in principle. Th e proper question is, wha t 
type of lack of knowledge caused by mental d isord er sho uid excuse. In 
most cases, defendants will have genera l intellectual knowledge of the 
legal and moral rules governing conduct, but because of crazy thoughts 
or perceptions (e.g., delusions or hallucin at ions), will irrationall y miscon-
ce ive the moral nature of their actions. For instance, a defendant who 
kills someone because of a delusional belief that the Lord commanded 
the ac tion in order to save the world, knows that ki lling is usuall y both a 
moral and legal wrong, and is intentionally killing a human being. Be-
cause the defendant has knowledge of the general rules and, in a nar row 
sense, of what he is doing, many critics of the insan ity defense claim that 
such a person should be convicted of murder. 100 Such a defendant 's cra-
ziness affects only motivation to commit the crime, and it is criminal law 
boilerplate that motivation is irrelevant to criminal guilt (although it may 
be considered at sentencing). 
Even if the crazy defendant in our example is narrowly aware tha t 
he is killing a human being, he is fundamentally and irrationally mis-
taken about the morally relevant facts. It is morally and legally insuffi-
cient to consider this type of defendant' s responsibility without regard to 
perceptions and reasons for ac ting based on those perceptions. 10 1 P er-
sons whose total understanding of what they are doing is gravely (and 
nonculpably) impaired are not as responsib le as those who understand or 
are capable of unders tanding the morally rel evan t facts. Rationality , the 
precondition for moral responsibility, is lacking in our example. 
At this point it may seem that I am using the defendant's motive to 
excuse. Although moti ves do not negate the elements of a crime, they 
are legally relevant for affirmative defenses (a nd for making inferences 
100. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3 (outl inin g the position of the author. William Frenc h Smith, 
former U.S. Attorney General). The Admin ist rati on's position has since soft ened, howevt~ r. Prcsi-
den : Reagan has signed new federa l crim inal legislation which does provide for a limited in sanity 
defense. See The Insan ity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 401-406, U.S. CODE 
Co~G. & Ao. NEws (9 8 Stat.) 205 7-68. 
10 1. Sir James Fit zjames Stephen has provided the mos t pit hy co unterasscrtion: 
My ow n op inion, however, is that if a specia l Di vine o rde r were give n to a man to commit 
murder, I shou ld certainly hang him for it unless I got a spec ia l Di vin e order not to hang 
him. What the effec t o f getti ng such an o rder would be is a ques ti on difficu lt for a nyo ne to 
answe r till he gets it. 
J. STEPHEN, 2 HISTORY OF THE CR t ~ I! Nr\L. L\W OF ENGLAND 160 n. l (1883). 
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about the presence of required mens rea). In a sense, defendants alleging 
duress assert an excusing motive for their actions: they intended to com-
mit their crimes with full knowledge of what they were doin g, but cla im 
that the reason they offended-the threats- should excuse them. Simi-
larly , defendants claiming insan ity contend that their motives are evi -
dence of fund ame ntal irrationa lit y regarding crucial, morally relevant 
aspec ts of their behavior. It must be remembered that, except in rare 
cases, mental di so rder does not nega te mens rea and thereby does not 
defeat the prosecution's prima fa cie case. 102 Insanit y is an affirmative 
defense whereby de fen dants usually admit the elements of the crimes, but 
c lo.im an excuse based on an irrational misperception , belief, or impulse. 
In the rare cases in which mental disorder negates m ens rea, it should not 
be seen as a separate defense; rather the mental disorder should lead di-
rectly to an acquittal because it defeats the prima facie case. 103 
The difficult task is to craft a cognitive test for legal insanity that 
exc uses those who are fundamentally irrational without allowing spuri-
ous claims to succeed. The language of the cognitive test must insure 
that the factfi nder understands the test is applicable only to a person 
whose moral perception of the context in which the crime is committed is 
fundamentally and irrationally mistaken. The test should excuse the de-
lusional defendant described above, even if he knew he was killing a 
human being. 
The Hinckley case illustrates this approach. Whether Hinckley 
sho uld have been excused depends on the conceptualization of his moti-
vation for attempting to assassinate President Reagan. Was he an un-
happy and misguided but nonetheless minimally rational young man who 
tried in a twisted way to obtain the love and attention he desired? Or was 
he a wildly deluded indi vidual who was grossly out of touch with reality, 
whose actions were an attempt to live out his delusions? Did he really 
believe that if he shot the President he would somehow obtain Jody Fos-
ter's love? I did not examine Hinckley and was not present at the trial, 
so it would be inappropriate for me to offer a view on the verdict. It 
seems clear, however, that if the latter conceptualization of his reasons is 
apt, he should have been excused, whereas if the former is the case, he 
should have been convicted. 
3. The Volitional Test 
Whether the insanity defense should also include a volitional test is 
102. See M orse, supra note 48. ;1t 40-42. 
103. !d. at 5-9. 
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more problemat ic as a matter of social policy. Should mental disorder 
provide the basis for a compulsion branch of the insanity defense and 
could such a compulsion excuse be properly adjudicated? 
An insani ty defense for compulsion, a so-called "volitional" test, 
will be possib le only if mental disorder produces the hard choice. Many 
persons beli·::ve that disordered behavior or behavior related to it is par-
ticularly compeiled and, consequently, that there is a special relationship 
between mental disorder and compulsion. By con trast , I believe that the 
relat ionship ot' mental disorder to compulsion is frustratingly vague, 10 _. 
and tha t there is no such special or necessary relationship. Examination 
of the tvlodel Penal Code's (the MPC) provisions concerning these issues 
is instruct ive. 105 The MPC bases general prima facie liability on a vo lun-
tary act, but defines voluntariness nega tively by listing a series of specific 
bodily movements, such as reflexes, tha t are not considered voluntary. 106 
The MPC also exempts from the voluntary category a vague, general 
class of bodily movements that are "not a product of the effort o r deter-
mination of the actor, either conscious or habitual." 107 Movements per-
formed under the influence of mental disorder are not specifically li sted 
as involuntary , and the behavior of disordered persons does not fit the 
vague, genera l exemption . Acts influenced by mental disorder are not 
reflexive, unconscious, or the like; crazy persons may have crazy reasons 
for their actions, but their acts are clearly products of conscious effort or 
determination. Thus, the MPC insanity test that absolves an actor who 
"lacks subst antial capacity to conform his conduct . . . to the require-
ments of law" 108 excuses the actor for a reason other than the invo lunta-
riness of the criminal conduct. 
Are disordered persons excused because their acts, although volun-
tary, involve hard-choice situations? Again, the answer appears negative. 
Crazy persons may act on the basis of hallucinat ions, delusions, or other 
misperceptions of reality, but they usually act without the pressure of a 
hard choice. Moreover, just because the crimes of crazy persons are 
caused docs not mean that they are compelled. All actions a re caused, 
but not a ll result from facing a hard choice. Much of the argument that 
104. i ndeed, I believe that the avai labi lity of a co mpul sion defense should not depend on 
whether the defendant su ffers from a menta l disorde r according to current concepts of wha t cons ti -
tutes mental disorde r. See infra tex t accompanying notes 109-1 3, 122. 
105. H. F10"C .·\KF.TTE & A. HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITI ES Al"'D CKIJ"v11NAL R ESPONS I BILITY 
46-47 ( 1979). 
106. MODEL I'L:--<.\L CODE §§ 2.0 l ( 1), 2.0 l(2)(a)-(c) (Proposed Offi cia l Draft 1962). 
107. !d. § 2.01(2)(d). 
108. Jd. § 4.01(1). 
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the acts of crazy persons are compelled or involuntary is simply a form of 
loose talk intended to justify the conclusion that crazy persons a re not 
responsible. Very few crazy persons face hard choices because of crazi-
ness, however, and very few are therefore co mpelled. In the absence of 
such compulsion , it is dirncult to make conceptual sense of the so-called 
volitional prong of the tests for legal insanity. 
We can understand that some test was originally needed to cope.: 
with cases of crazy perso ns who seemed to know right from wrong, but 
neverthel ess ac ted for crazy reasons. The person who acts on the basis of 
a religious delusion is an example. But such a person is not compelied 
simply because he or she acts on the basis of a strongly held, albeit crazy, 
belief. Nor is the person compelled because craziness influenced the be-
havior . In the absence of a hard choice, action pursuant to a crazy desire 
is no more compelled than action based on a normal desire. The proper 
reason to excuse, of course, is that the person was irrational-even 
though narrowly aware of right and wrong-not that the person was 
compelled . Thus, a reasonable explanation of the current use of the voli-
tional prong is approximately this : A person who is grossly out of touch 
with reality, all mixed up about the world, finds it harder to behave ap-
propriately, including lawfully/rightly. "Harder" does not imply com-
pelled in the volitional sense, however. It simply means that it is more 
difficult to act appropriately if c razy thoughts and feelings interfere. 
Again, the law should treat such cases as instances of irrationality, not 
compulsion. 
A re there any cases of crazy persons in which a pure compuision 
excuse seems proper? The only appropriate instances appear to be the 
so-called impulse di sorders, where the actor is cognitively rational but 
has an inner craving to do a prohibited act, for example, the kleptoma-
niac's impulse to steal, the DDP's desire for drugs, or the pedophile's 
desire for sexual contact with children. Although these people are cogn i-
tively rational, 109 they do suffer from a mental disorder according to the 
current, predominant psychiatric classification system of the American 
Psychiatric Association, 11 0 and all of their crimes-lewd and lascivious 
conduct with minor, theft , drug use-would, in principle, result from 
impulses arising from mental disorder. 111 Are these hard-choice situa-
tions, however, and, furth er, a re they distinguishable from other "nor-
I 09. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
110. AM E RI CA N !'SYCIIIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIA GNOSTIC AND STAT IST ICAL MANU ,\L OF 
ME NTAL DI SO RD E RS I 64-65 , 27 1-72, 29 3-94 (3d ed. 1980) (hereinafter c ited as D SM-lll]. 
111 . !d. at I 64-65 (subs tance abuse); id. a t 271-72 (pedophilia); id. at 293-94 (kleptomania). 
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mal" predispositions such as "moneyphilia" (the greedy person's craving 
for money) that may lead to illegal behavior? 
Although impossible to prove, it seems likely that inner cravings can 
sometimes produce hard-choice situations. If the inner craving is strong 
enough, produces fear of the pain caused by refusing the craving, and no 
reasonable alternative courses of action a re available, then perhaps an 
excuse should obta in . But why excuse the kleptomaniac or DDP, but 
not the moneyphile? One could argue tha t the moneyphile does not suf-
fer from a disease whereas the kleptomaniac or DDP does, but this 
would allow the tail to wag the dog. Medical categories should not dic-
tate legal excuses. If a particular moneyphile meets the hard-choice 
moral/legal criteria for excuse, why should it matter whether the condi-
tion is a recognized mental disorder? Both normal and abnormal cravers 
will sometimes face true pain caused by factors for which they are not 
responsible. Although people who suffer from abnormal cravings may 
have fewer alternatives than people who suffer from normal cravings, it is 
surely true that some normal cravers are sometimes in situations where 
there are no reasonable alternatives. The upshot of this analysis is that 
there may be cases of mental disorder that necessitate an independent 
compulsion branch of the insanity defense. In the absence of a general 
compulsion excuse, however, the conceptual problem is limiting the de-
fense to abnormal cravings. I see no rational way to do this, although 
intuitively the criteria may be more likely satisfied by abnormal cravers. 
Perhaps the dil emma created by the fuzzy distinction between nor-
mal and abnormal cravings can be resolved in the following definitional 
manner: We might wish to redefine as abnormal any craving tha t com-
pels illegal behavior because the law cannot expect unusually difficult 
self-restraint. Thus, such strong inner cravings must be abnormal by def-
inition . It is of course possible to classify these extreme conditions as 
mental disorders, 11 2 but such redefinition simply begs the hard concep-
tual questions of what behavior should be considered mental disorder 
and whether mental disorder should be a necessary criterion for a com-
pulsion excuse. As a practical matter, few persons might try to raise 
such a defense for fear of facing life-long restraint, even if they are not 
responsible for their inner cravings. 
The consideration of the distinction between normal and abnormal 
cravings also helps clarify the law's treatment of various strong desires to 
offend. For example, in a recent case a court rejected a defendant's claim 
112. Such conditions would fit the generic definition of mental disord er p rovided by the Ameri-
can Psyc hia tric A ssocia tion. DSM-1!1 , supra note 110, a t 6. 
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that "pathological gambling" should support an insanity defense, in part 
on the ground that a very strong desire does not amount to a compui-
sion.113 But was the court's analysis correct? Any strong desire to offend 
will certainly cause pain if the person foregoes offending, and one can 
argue that the desire must have been very strong indeed if fear of the law 
was not strong enough to inhibit the offense. Thus, a defendant could 
claim that foregoing gambling, raping, burning, or whatever \vould have 
produced substantially more pain than offending, and that fear of the 
former motivated the offense. 
The problem with such claims is that they simply are not credible, 
except perhaps in extreme cases. We do not believe that it is fear of the 
pain of not raping, burning, or gambling that drives the actor. Instead, 
we are quite sure in most cases that it is the pleasure offending will pro-
duce-a personal gain-that drives the person. In a given case, however, 
the defendant may be able to convince us that the desire or craving was 
so intense that fear of the pain of not satisfying it was the true motive for 
offending. Indeed, the actor might claim that he or she hated the impulse 
and loathed himself or herself for having it. Perhaps these situations are 
what is meant by "pathological" impulses of any type, and an excuse 
should obtain in such extreme cases. Note, however, that compulsion 
causes us to classify the impulse as "pathological"; the label "pathologi-
cal" does not cause us to classify the case as one of compulsion. 
Finally, one might argue that there is no volitional problem at all in 
cases of inner cravings. Herbert Fingarette and Anne Hasse, for exam-
ple, have argued that the person who acts "compulsively" or under the 
influence of some irresistible impulse, mood, or passion is absolutely in-
tent on acting. 114 By what independent criteria, they ask, could one 
classify such conduct as involuntary: "On the face of it, one would see 
'compulsive' conduct as an expression of (stubborn) 'will' par excel-
lence." 115 They conclude that something ought to excuse defendants in 
cases of such extraordinary "persistence," but the ground for the excuse 
is that the person's behavior was irrational rather than involuntary. 116 
Fingarette and Hasse are surely correct in stating that compelled 
behavior is intentional and that notions of the will being overwhelmed 
are metaphysical. 1 17 The hard-choice criteria are hardly metaphysical, 
113. United States v. Lyons , 731 f.2d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 1984). 
114. H. fiNGARETTE & A. HASSE, supra note 105, at 61. 
115. hi. (emph asis in original). 
116. !d. 
117. !d. 
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however, and the difficulty of assessing them in cases of inner cravings is 
primarily a practical ground for distinguishing cases of external compul-
sion such as duress. If obstinate single-mindedness were a criterion for 
irrationality, would not all single-minded persons, such as Martin Lu-
ther, be considered irrational? One could distinguish the cases of inner 
cravings based on th e ration ality of the goal obstinately pursued, but it is 
extraordinarily difficult to assess the rati onality of goals. 118 For instance, 
one could rationally classify the goal of the kleptomaniac as the relief of 
psychic tension produced by the desire to stea l. If the goal is "stealing 
without reason" the goal appears irrational, but on what ground, in-
dependent of the resuit we wish to achieve, should we prefer that charac-
terization of the goal? In the case of the DDP or the pedophile, the 
irrationality analysis is even more problematic. Sexual pleasure or enjoy-
able drug-induced feelings are quite rational goals, and the means chosen 
to achieve them, albeit illegal, are rationally adapted to succeed. Note, 
too, that the means Luther chose to reform the Church were also consid-
ered illegitimate, albeit rationally adapted to his goal. 
A final argument for treating some cases of inner cravings as ration-
ality problems would be this : Suppose the actor does not accept such 
impulses; they do not feel like part of the actor, who is ashamed of them, 
hates them, disowns them, or whatever. The actor may be able to choose 
means rationally suited to achieve the ends dictated by the disowned and 
unaccepted cravings, but one might argue that such a person, whose 
desires are in such conflict, is not rational. Intense and uncomfortable 
ambivalence or conflict about one's desires would then become a touch-
stone of irrationality. In these cases the criteria for irrationality collapse 
into those of hard choice (or vice versa) because the person suffering 
from intense conflict arguably faces a hard choice. Does rationality re-
quire that persons be the (comfortable) masters of their own houses, 
however? These persons' goals are intelligible and nothing is amiss with 
their practical reasoning. There is no cognitive misfiring if such persons 
feel intensely competing desires , even ones that may be deemed unaccept-
able. Although considering ambivalent persons irrational may be an ap-
pealing practical solution to the problem of defining hard choices in some 
cases of inner cravings, doing so appears to be a conclusory use of an 
unusual definition. I believe our ordinary intuition in such cases is that 
the problem is hard choice and not irrationality. Ambivalence is not a 
criterion for irrationality. Finally, not all persons are ambivalent about 
118. See supra text accompanying note 14. 
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their impulses, and some of th ese persons may nonetheless face hard 
choices. 
T here appears to be a prima facie case for a compulsion branch of 
the insanity defense, but is it persuasi ve and would the test be workable? 
If or to what degree a person's desire o r im pulse to act was controllable is 
not determinable: there is no sc ientific test to judge whether an im pulse 
was irresistible or sim ply not resisted. A t best , we may develop a phe-
nomenological account of the defendant' s subjec ti ve state of mind that 
will permit a common sense assessm ent of how much compulsion ex-
isted. Mental health experts would sti ll be unable to determin e scientifi-
ca ll y if a defendant was sufficientl y compelled to be legally insane. Legal 
insanity is not a scientific or purely empirical issue; experts can, at most, 
provide richly deta iled information about the defendant's mental state at 
the time of the crime and under simila r circumstances in the past. 
Assuming that assessment of compulsion problems is possible, 
should such problems negate responsibility if the defendant otherwise 
seems fundamentally cognitively rational? The criminal law already al-
lows excuses or mitiga tion for control problems-for example, duress 
and the provocation/passion formula to reduce murder to manslaugh-
ter-so an excuse for such problems has ample precedent. 11 9 In fact, 
however, as we have seen, a strong impulse to offend almost always re-
sults from some species of cognitive irrationality, and a primary difficulty 
with excusing allegedly compelled but rational persons on the ground of 
insanity is that they do not seem substantially crazy. Their urges may be 
inexplicable to most people, but overall these persons appear fundamen-
tally rational. Most people continue to believe that if an actor was rea-
sonably rational, then the behavior could have been controlled. 120 
Laypersons are more likely to consider these urges bad rather than mad, 
and to blame the impulse-driven person for having or giving in to them . 
As a result, lay persons are fa r less willing to accept the conclusion that 
these people are mentally di sordered. Indeed, whether these sorts of con-
ditions a re appropriately characterized as disorders is a matter of some 
dispute even within the mental health professions . 12 1 By contrast , 1t IS 
generally conceded tha t persons who are fund amentally irrational are 
11 9. A ddendant act ing in the heat of passion can also be seen as suffering from rationalit y 
problems rat her than self-control problems. Although th is might be the more acc ura te view, self-
control problems are a trad iti ona l JUStificati on for heat of passion mitiga tion. 
120. H .L.A. H ART , PUNISH:v!E:-.'T AND RESPOt'S IBILITY: EsSAYS IN THE PHILOSOP H Y GF 
LAW 176 (1968). 
12 1. Eysenck, Wakefield , J r. & Friedman, Diagnoses and Clinical Assessment: The DSM-III, 34 
ANN. REV . PSYC HO LOGY 167, 189 (1983). 
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"sick," and they are therefore rarely blamed for their irrationality. Thus, 
an insanity defense for pure impulse problems threatens to unde rmine 
the moral support for the defense. 
More importantly, a lega l excuse for "impulse" problems in the ab-
sence of cognitive irrationality raises perhaps intractable line-drawing 
problems. H ow should society respond to an otherwise rat ional person 
who describes an "overwhelming" urge to offe nd based on a hard choice 
for whatever cause? Consider an otherwise normal but highly dependent 
person who offends in response to strong pee r pressure to take part in a 
criminal scheme. What reason is there to believe th at this person is less 
compelled than a mentally disordered person? 122 Moreover, what is to 
prevent mental health professionals from defming as disordered anyone 
who gives in to such an urge to offend? One need only consult the crite-
ria for the American Psychia tric Association's diagnostic category, "An-
tisocial Personality Disorder, " 123 to determine that, in som e m easure, 
such a definition of disorder has already been adopted. Medical doc-
trines may thus swallow up those of the law. There are mentally disor-
dered persons who feel terribly strong urges that most people would 
consider abnormal, and on occasion these persons yield to such urges and 
offend the law. But providing an insanity defense in these cases is practi-
cally difficult and morally questionable. 
Finally, volitional tests provide mental health experts with the 
chance to present the court with the shakiest scientific and clinical data 
and conclusions. In my experience, few mental health professionals un-
derstand the relationship between determinism and legal responsibility, 
apparently due to a belief that determinism and responsibility are neces-
sarily incompatible. 124 They commonly confuse causation with ex-
cuse. 125 For instance, thev mav believe that a defendant who acted on the 
basis of a delusion must have been unable to test reality against the delu-
sion or to resist acting on the delusion . Sometimes the belief is even more 
simplistic: if the defendant's criminal behavior was influenced by m ental 
disorder, the defendant must not have been responsible. There are no 
scientific tests for whether defendants could have controlled themselves, 
122. J. FEINBERG, DOING AN D D ES ER VING : ESSAYS IN TH E T HEORY OF RESPONS IBILITY 282 
( 1970): see supra text accompanying notes l09-l3. 
12 3. See DSM-III, supra note ll O, at 3 17-2 1. 
124. See State v. Sikora, 44 N.J. 453, 461 , 210 A.2d 193, 197 (1965) (test imony assuming th at 
a ll persons a re determined and not responsible). For a discussion of the position th a t det erminism 
and responsibility are compatibl e, see L DAVI S, supra note 33, passim; A. KENNY, FREE WiLL AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 22-45 (1978); Moore, supra note 33 , passim . 
125. See, e.g., supra tex t accompanying notes 40-51. 
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however, and the presence of mental disorder at the time of a crime does 
not inexorably lead to the conclusion that a defendant is not responsibl e. 
Nevertheless, mental health experts repeatedly offer such conclusions, 
wrapping nonsc ientific and often confused mo ral :1sscssments in the es-
teemed and protective mantl es of science and medicin e. 126 These difficul-
ties may be ameliorated to some extent by restrict ing expe rt tes timony, as 
I argue later, 127 but testimony on the volitiona l issue \\ill in evitably be 
less rigorous than on the cognitive iss ue. 
I confess to considerable ambivalence about vo litional tests for legal 
insanity. On the one hand, as noted, the law already allows other voli-
tional exc uses such as duress. In principle, why should the law dist in -
guish between the compulsion produced by a gun at one' s head and the 
compulsion produced by psychologica l or biological variables? Few peo-
ple would deny that in some cases internal pressures can be strong. 12 ~ 
N evertheless, I believe that retaining a volitional branch would be a mis-
take: distinguishing between resistible and irresistible internal states is 
simply too difficult. 
Many persons have a strong intuition that compulsion (or hard 
choice) not tied to irrationality should be an independent basis of excuse, 
but it is difficult to provide adequate criteria for compulsion that morally 
justify excusing. I have tried to do so, but many persons sympathetic to 
the compulsion ground for excuse will find those criteria unsatisfactory. 
On the other hand, I have been unable to devise better criteria for inner 
compulsion. This does not mean, of course, that such criteria do not 
exist. If theoret ically satisfactory criteria for inner compulsions based on 
mental disorder cannot be provided, however, it is conceivable that inner 
compulsion independent of irrationality should not provide a moral 
ground for excuse. Moreover, adjudicating volitional tests is fraught with 
the dangers of using unscientific and misleading expert testimony. In 
contrast, it is far easier to determine what a person of reasonable firmness 
would do when confronted with an external threat, the nature and 
126. This is much less o f a problem for a cognitive test. What a d efendant beli eved is hard to 
determine, but. unlike whether a defenda nt was compe lled , it is nonetheless a more determinate 
ques ti o n. Suc h differences have led many recent commentators to s ugges t abo lis hin g the vo litio na l 
branch. STATEME:--IT ON TH E INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 97 , a t 11. The A MA also subscribes to 
this view. AMA REPORT. supra note 40, at 2971. 
127. Sec infra tex t accompanying notes 131-35. 
128. An interesting issue is whether we should e.xpec t persons to resist suc h feelings by exerting 
greater se lf-control as the severity of the "compelled" harm in c reases. The Mod el Penal Cod e al-
ready does this in the case of duress by inquirin g whether a perso n of reasonable firmness wou ld 
yie ld . MODEL PE NA L CODE§ 2.09(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). A pe rso n of reasonable firm-
ness would presumab ly yield less readily to the command to comm it a more heinous c rime. 
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strength of which can be more objectively determined. Finally, I fear for 
the public perception of the morality and wisdom of the insanity defense 
if we allow an excuse for persons not generally viewed as sick. 
If our intuition about internal compulsions as an independent basis 
of excuse is strong enough to overcome the difficulties with determining 
\Vhat those compulsions are, then the law must retain a volitional branch 
of the insanity defense test. But, it should then excuse only those defend-
ants whose nonculpable impulse 12 '~ was the overwhelmingly predominant 
reason they offended. The compulsion criteria must be met. Impulse 
problems range along a continuum of hard choices, of course, but the law 
should require the greatest possible degree of self-control from all per-
sons, and should excuse only those whose compulsions drove them be-
yond any reasonable margin of self-discipline. Although some persons 
with great compulsion problems may still be convicted under such a 
stringent formula, those convicted would be only those whose hard 
choices were not overwhelming. The law should require such persons to 
restrain themselves, even if it is hard for them to do so. 
4. The Craziness Test 
Although a workable, restricted test similar to present tests can be 
constructed, I would like to suggest a new alternative: 
A defendant is not guilty by reason of insanity if, at the time of the 
offense, the defendant was so extremely crazy and the craziness so sub-
stanti ally affected the criminal behavior that the defendant does not 
deserve to be punished . 
F rom past experience, I know that this test produces reactions ranging 
from utter disbelief to profound shock. Immediate critical responses in-
clude the following: It is too vague; it gives juries unbridled discretion 
and no guidance; it fails to mention mental disorder; it will allow too 
many acquittals. My responses to such criticisms are that this test tracks 
the moral issues with greater honesty and precision, is more workable, 
and will not lead to more acquittals or "wrong" acquittals more often 
than do present tests or reformed versions of present tests. 
Legal insanity is a social, moral, and legal issue, not a medical or 
psychiatric issue. The question in insanity defense cases is not whether 
the defendant suffered from a mental disorder; the real issue that juries 
decide-no matter what test they use-is whether the defendant's behav-
ior related to the offense was so crazy, so irrational, that the defendant 
!29. See supra text accompanying notes 17-23. 
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should be excused. 130 The virtue of the proposed test is that it asks thi s 
basic ques tion directly and without pseudomedicalization. The relation-
ship of craziness to responsibility can be unpacked into cogni tive an d 
volitional considerations, but doing so in an insanity defense tes t provides 
onl y an a ura of fal se precision and guidance. Indeed, the proposed test is 
no more vag ue than are present tes ts. Present criteria! form ul ati ons--for 
example, knowing right from wrong or lacking substanti a l capacit y to 
ap prec iate the c riminalit y o r wrongfuln ess of one's ac tions-are hardly 
bri ght line tes ts tha t give juries clea r guidance. Moreover, fo rmula tio ns 
invo lving cognitive or vo litional di sabilities often confuse ju r ies , whereas 
a craziness standard is more within the domain of common sense. Ad-
di ng language about " extremeness" makes it even clearer to th e jury that 
the test is meant to be res tricted to very few defendants. If one objects 
that the word "extreme" is vague, let me suggest that it is likely to be 
clearer to a lay juror than the phrase "lack of substantial capacity. " Ju-
rors instructed to use th e craziness test are no more or less likely to ac-
quit than they are with any other test, because the question is a lways the 
same despite differences in wording. Finally, this test wo uld have an 
enormously salutary role in helping define the proper role of experts in 
insanity defense trials . 
B. L IMITING TH E ROLE OF MENTAL H EALTH EXPE RT S 
The proper role of experts is a major source of criticism of the in-
sanity defense's administration . An appalling "circus atmosphere" re-
sults when mental health experts give opposing psychiatric and lega l 
conclusio ns or weave fanciful theories about the defendant 's behav ior . 
T he battle of the experts is especially dismaying when it occurs in highl y 
publicized or politically or socially important cases such as the prosecu-
tion of Si rhan Sirhan, Pa tty Hearst, or John Hinckley, Jr. 13 1 In all fa ir-
ness, the problem is not the experts' fault. The legal system has c rea ted 
this predicament by asking the wrong questions. The answer is not to 
abandon the defense, however, but to reform the role of the experts by 
recognizing and asking the proper questions. 
The bas ic issue in insanity defense cases-whether the defendant 's 
craziness so influenced the criminal behavior that it would be unjust to 
130. This claim, which is impossible either to prove o r disprove, is supported to some d e-gree by 
com mon sense and by the resea rch c ited in Pasewa rk , supra no te 59. a t 38 5-90 (demons tra tin g that 
the test used probably does no t substa ntiall y affec t jury outcomes). 
13 1. The '"c ircus atmosphere" objection may be oversta ted beca use in cases o f c lea r insa nity 
the re is seldom a trial. MYTII S AN D REALITI ES, supra note 54, a t 23 -24. N onethel ess. it is a sub-
stantial problem in some cases, especially those th at are highly publicized. 
822 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:777 
convict and punish the defendant-is, as noted, a social, moral, and legal 
issue and not a medical question. Diagnoses and unvalidated specula-
tions are simply irrelevant to this question. 132 Diagnoses and causal 
speculations may be helpful in the clinic, consulting room, and research 
laboratory, but knowing whether and allegedly why the defendant suffers 
from a particular mental disorder according to current diagnostic no-
menclature or etiological theories is not useful in a courtroom in deciding 
whether the defendant was legally sane. The issue is not \vhether or why 
the defendant suffers from any particular mental disorder, but whether 
the insanity defense test is met. This can be demonstrated far more con-
vincingly by factual descriptions of behavior than by the ascription of 
labels or the postulation of theories. 133 What factfinders need are full, 
textured descriptions of the defendant's behavior, not diagnoses or specu-
lations about the causes of the defendant's behavior. Learning that a 
defendant killed because he believed he was the victim of a plot is rele-
vant to determining if he knew the moral nature of his acts; learning that 
the defendant was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia does not aid 
that determination. A scientifically unvalidated speculation about why 
this defendant believed he was the victim of a plot is likewise irrelevant to 
a cognitive, volitional, or craziness test, and, worse, it is confusing. 
Moreover, knowing the alleged cause of behavior does not tell us whether 
the defendant was compelled. All behavior is caused, but causation is 
not the equivalent of compulsion. Jurors' frequent complaints that they 
cannot be expected to resolve insanity defense cases when even the ex-
perts disagree about the diagnoses or why defendants behaved as they did 
demonstrate that the jurors have seriously misunderstood the insanity 
defense. 
Finally, mental health experts have no expertise whatsoever about 
the ultimate issue of legal insanity precisely because it is a nonexpert, 
legal issue. Whether and to what degree a defendant was sufficiently 
crazy, knew the morally relevant facts, or was compelled are common-
sense judgments that must be made on the basis of knowledge of the 
defendant's thoughts, feelings, and actions. There is no scientific test 
that enables us to draw these inferences; it is a matter of common sense 
and lay assessment based on common life experience. Again, whether 
the irrationality or compulsion was sufficient for legal excuse is a moral 
and legal determination, not a purely factual matter. It may be difficult to 
132. See Morse, supra note 3, at 604-19; Morse, Failed Explanarions and Criminal Responsibil-
iry: Experts and the Unconscious , 68 VA. L. REv. 971, 1044-52, 1059-82 (1982); Morse, supra note 
48, at 51-55. 
133. See infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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agree on a verdict in close insanity defense cases, but this is not because 
the ultimate issue is a scientific matter beyond the ken of laypersons. 
These are just hard cases. Wh en experts offer op inions on the ultimate 
legal issue, they function not as sc ientific experts but as thirteenth jurors 
in a system that has decided twelve persons good and true are sufficient. 
To remedy the "circus atmosphe re' · of insa nit y trials, ex perts should 
be prohibited from offe ring diagnoses, unva!idated ex plana tions, and ulti-
mate lega l conclusions. 134 Most of the conflic ting expert testimony in 
insanity defense cases concerns mental health conclusions, such as diag-
noses or speculative explanations, and legal conclusions. Experts are far 
less likely to disagree about behavioral descriptions than about diagnoses 
irrelevant to the legal determination that must be made. It is the descrip-
tions that jurors or judges need. Even if the behavioral descriptions still 
provide an opportunity for experts to affect verdicts, it will probably be 
harder to bias observations than conclusions, and jurors are more likely 
to eva luate such bias adequately. When unnecessary and speculative ex-
planations are admitted into evidence, they too will be a source of disa-
greement: one does not expect agreement on matters that lack a firm 
scientific foundation. Finally, expert disagreement about legal issues is 
totally predictable because there is no reason why mental health experts 
should agree on an issue that is not a matter of mental health expertise. 
Experts should be limited to offering both full , rich, clinical descrip-
tions of thoughts, feelings , and actions and relevant da ta based on sound 
sc ientific studies. They will then perform a useful function and, in most 
cases, the battle of the experts will be reduced to minor skirmishes. 
There will be less expert di sagreement and consequen tly less jury confu-
sion . The factfinder will be better able to resolve the remaining conflicts 
because these will largely involve data about behavior that jurors can 
assess themselves. In sum, experts should be limited to offering only the 
data that are truly relevant and within their area of expertise. This will 
reduce the confusion between psychiatric and legal issues experienced by 
jurors and society at large, better enable juries to understand individual 
cases, and preserve greater respect for the trial process. 135 
134. This final suggestion about lega l conc lu sions has been ado pted by many commentators and 
by the new federal legislation. See STAT EMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE, supra note 97, at 14; 
AMERI CAN BA R ASSOCIATION, CR IMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL H EALTH STANDA RDS § 7-3.9(a) 
( 1984). 
135. Note that th e craziness tes t for lega l in sanity would decrease th e lik elih ood that experts 
wou ld offe r and co urts wou ld accept the irreleva nt or act ua ll y nonexpert tes timony that represen ts 
the bu lk o f expert evidence today. De let ing mention of menta l disorder in the test removes a major 
sou rce of confusion of sc ientific a nd legal issues. Diag noses a nd ca usa l specu lat io ns are irrelevant 
and the ultima te de termina tio n is legal, not scien tific. The com mon sense a nd o rdinary language of 
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C. ALLOCATING THE BURD EN OF P ERSUAS ION 
Allocating the burden of persuasion on insanity is a particularly 
thorny issue. Because insanity is an atnrmat ive defense that does not 
negate the elements of the prima faci e case, the federal Constitut ion per-
mits the burden of persuasion to remain on the defendant. 136 Neverthe-
less, once the defendant has produced sufficient evidence to rai se the 
issue, many jurisdictions shift the burden of persuasion to the prosecu-
tion to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Beca use a defend ant' s 
mental disorder may fundam entally affect culpability, the argument that 
the sta te should assume the risk of error by bearing the burden of persua-
sion is reasonable. 13 7 This argument is premised on the soc ial belief that 
it is better for ten truly sane people to be acquitted than for one truly 
insane person to be convicted; our society prefers a wrongful acquittal to 
a wrongful conviction. 138 
I believe, however, that the law should place the burden of persua-
sion on the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. All factors 
bearing on guilt, including universally accepted defenses such as self-de-
fense, need not be proven by the prosecution. By so placing the burden, 
society would minimize the risk of success of insanity defenses in ques-
tionable cases, and at the same time would permit the defense to succeed 
in the few cases in which it is morally proper. The defendant is making a 
claim that is rarely justified and personally possesses particularly privi-
leged access to the information necessary to support the plea. Although 
the prosecution may have its own expert examine the defendant , the de-
fenda nt nevertheless retains a major advantage on the issue because the 
defendant is best able to provide testimony about past mental state. In 
insanity cases, where motives are often in issue, the usual inferences 
about mental states that are drawn from observing behavior cannot be 
made with the same degree of certainty as in cases involving technical 
m ens rea elements because the defendant 's mental state is allegedly both 
unusual and abnormal. Requiring the prosecution to prove sanity once 
the tes t wou!d inc rease juror confidence by showing th em tha t th e dete rmina tio n to be made is well 
within the ir com petence. The experts' ability to overw helm o r pla inl y bamboozle jurors would be 
red uced. 
136. See Rivera v. State, 351 A.2d 561, 562-63 (Del. ), appeal denied, 429 U.S 877 (19 76). 
137. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 697-98 (1975): see also Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 
197, 226-27 (1977) (Powell , J., dissenting) (sta te should ::~ssume burden ··on ly if the fac to r a t issue 
ma kes a substantia l difference between guilt and innocence'" ). 
138. This is a paraphrase, of course, of the chestnut tha t it is be tter to free ten gu ilt y persons 
th an to convict one innocent person. Th e Supreme Court has rejected th is ana logy in the c ivil 
commitmen t context. Add ington v. T exas , 441 U.S. 41 8, 428 (1979) (refu sin g to apply the reason-
ab le doubt standard) . 
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the slight production burden is met is simply too difficult; it will allow 
the defense to be raised in an unjustifiably high number of cases . No 
substantial injustice to the defendant will result from placing the persua-
sion burden on the defendant because, when legal insanity is truly pres-
ent under a narrow test for insani ty, most cases will be quite clear. 
Finally, if the insanity defense is not constitutionally required , 13 9 provid-
ing it is solely a vol untary act of compass ion by the state. Because the 
state is not required to prove every facto r bearing on culpability, placing 
the insan ity burden on the defe ndant is no more unfai r than si mila r 
placem ent of any other affirmative defense such as duress. 
An alternati ve is to allocate the burden of persuasion to the prosecu-
tion, but to lower the standard from " beyond a reasonable doubt" to "a 
preponderance of the evidence" or " clear and convincing evidence." 
This would decrease the risk of error to the defend ant somewhat, while 
still allowing society to decrease its risk somewhat of unwarranted but 
successful insanity pleas . I do not favor this compromise because it in-
creases the risk of questionable verdicts and creates too much evidentiary 
difficulty for the prosecution , but it would be a better solution than forc-
ing the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. 
D. POSTACQUITTAL STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES: COMMITMENT 
AND R ELEAS E 
The crucial and mos t unse ttling issue for most persons is deciding 
what should be done with those who are acquitted by reason of insanity. 
In the past, acquitted defendants were automatically committed to state 
hospitals for the criminally insane-institutions normally just as punitive 
as prisons-and they typically remained there for lengthy periods, often 
for the rest of their li ves. Thus, society was able, in effect , to punish these 
persons despite their lack of lega l responsibility . Society's fear of insani ty 
acquittals was vitiated because acquittees were committed with little if 
any hope of early release. 
M ore recently, the law affecting insanity acquittees has changed in 
response to both concern for their constitutional rights and a better un-
derstanding of the purposes of their commitments. 140 D efendan ts acquit-
139. See supra text accompa nying note 83. 
140. German & Singer, Pu nishing !he No! Guilry: Hospiralizarion of Persons Acquiued by R ea-
son of l nsanily, 29 R UTGERS L. REv. 1011, 105 6-74 (1976); M orris, Dealing Responsibly wirh rh e 
Crimina!!y Irresponsible, 1982 AR IZ. ST. L.J . 855, 870-83; Note, Rules for an Exceplional Class: The 
Commilmenl and Release of Persons Acquirred of Violenl Offenses by R eason of !nsanily, 57 N.Y .U. 
L. REV. 28 1, 288-90 ( 1982) 
A standard cla im over the years has been that the in sanity defense is a sham beca use acq ui tted 
826 SOUTHER N CALIFORNIA LAW R EVIEW [Vo l. 58:777 
ted because of insanity are now entitled to hea rings within a reasonable 
period after acquittal to determine if they are still mentally disordered 
and dangerous. 141 An acquittal by reason of insanity is based on th e 
d efendant's past mental state at the time of the offense, whereas the ac-
quittal typically occurs m onths or even years later, by which time the 
defendant 's condition may have changed considerably. Co mmitm ent is 
no t justified unless the insanit y acquittee is currentl y dangerous because 
of continued disorder. 142 Moreover, it is reasonably clear that commit -
ted insanity acquittces a re entitled to reasonable, periodic review of their 
continuing need for confinement 143 and to adequate treatment. 144 In-
defc nd ::ml s ar<C in fact punished as ha rshly as they would have been if they were convicted. See. e.g .. 
L. COLG1AN , THE REI GN OF ERR OR: PSYCHIATRY, AUTHO RITY .-\0 0 LAW 32, 52-54. 6 1 ( 1984). 
It might be argued, conseq uent ly , tha t !ega! changes mea nt to p rotect th e right o f acquit tees a re 
hypoc ritica l a nd should no t be pursued. I do not den y the a mbiva lence with which society trea ts 
in sanit y acquittees, but this ambi va lence is not a jus tification fo r abo li shing the defense o r aba n-
doning a ttempts to make the com mitment p rocess and the co nditi ons o f commitment as fa ir, hu-
mane, a nd nonpunitive as poss ible . Indeed , recogniti on o f thi s am biva lence a nd of pas t hypoc ri sy 
shou ld spur refo rm effo rt s. 
141. See. e.g., CAL. P EN AL CODE§ 1026 (West 1982 & Sup p. 198 5). 
142. Note that commitment should follow only if the acquit tee is dange rous because di so rd ered. 
If the person is disordered and dangerous but the two conditions a re not related, commitment is 
im proper because neither m enta l diso rder nor dangerousness a lone j ustifies commitment. See Jack-
so n v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1 972) ("At the least, clu e process requires that th e na ture a nd 
d ura tio n of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose fo r which the indi vidua l is 
co mmi tted." ). This point is discussed in deta il infra no tes 147-51 and accom panying tc:x t. 
143. The Supreme Court has neve r directly ruled on this po int , but a number o f cases a re analo-
gous. In Addington v. T exas, 441 U. S. 41 8, 428-29 (1 979), the Court st ro ngly impli ed tha t pe riodic 
reexamina tion o f the bas is fo r commitment was cons titutiona ll y req uired . A lthough it is a rguable 
tha t d iffe ren t standa rds and proced ures fo r releasing co mmitt ees and acquittees migh t be cons tit u-
tionally permissible, it is di ffic u lt to justify failing to provide acqu it tees with some: form al. paiod ic 
opportunity to demonstrate th at th e purposes of commitment a re no longer met. See also O' Co nnor 
v. Donaldson, 422 US. 56 3, 574-75 (1975) (involuntary civil commitm ent must end if the co mmit-
ment criteria are no longer sa ti sfied ). 
144. In Youngberg v. R omeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 ( 1982), th e sta te co nceded and the Su preme 
Court appeared to assume tha t an inst itu tionalized inmate o f a hospi ta l fo r the retard ed was en titled 
to medica l care , and in Estelle v. Ga mble, 429 U.S. 97 , 103-05 ( 1977), the Court he ld th a t the fa ilure 
of prison offi c ia ls or pe rsonnel to a ttend to the serious medi ca l needs o f a n inma te constituted a 
vio lation of th e eighth amend me nt. 
I believe that Youngberg a nd Gamble toge ther s ta nd fo r the proposition <ha t a ny in volunta ry 
in mate of a state instituti on has a ri gh t to minimall y adequa te medi ca l ca re. See Note, The Con.Hilu-
lional Righi 10 Trea1m en1 in Ligh 1 of Youngberg v. R omeo, 72 GEO. L.J . 17 85, 1794 n.46 ( 1984). 
Beca use mental disord er must be considered a medical prob lem if th e commitment process is to 
reta in its medical justification, and beca use acquittees suffer from seri ous disorders by definition, th e 
acquitt ees are entitled to minimally reasonable treatment for menta l as well as physical disorders. I 
am not suggesting that there is a n exte nsive constitutional right to trea tm en t for involunt a ry psychi-
a tric pa tients, although I believe t here should be. I am sugges ting, howeve r, that if ment a l diso rde r 
is j ust like any other diso rde r, involuntary pa tients who suffe r from it a re cons titution a lly entitl ed to 
mi nimall y reasonable ca re fo r it. It seems cl ear, for ins tance, tha t a pr ison fa iling to provide any 
trea tment to a convic t who became wildl y psychotic while serving a pri son te rm would vio late the 
eighth a mendment ri gh ts presc ribed in Gamble. Similarl y, acq uittccs must be pro vid ed reasonable 
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sanity acquittees committed to an institution are disorde red , nonrespon-
sible, and incarcerated with no opportunity to seek treatment on their 
own , and treatment is one of the purposes of comrnitment to a hospital. 
Given the advances in psychiatric and psychological treatment, many ac-
quittees can now be restored to a symptomless condition in relatively 
short periods of time, and a good number are released quickly. 
The early rel ease of insan ity acquittees is the major concern of in-
sanity defense critics. They point to the few cases in which those released 
have committed heino us crimes even though mental health professionals 
deemed them well and no longer dangerous. Those \vho fear for societal 
safety doubt the ability of mental heal th profess ionals either to determine 
reliabl y which insanity acquittees are substantially cu red or to predict 
accurately who will no longer be a threat. These criticisms and concerns 
have considerable merit, so it is important to analyze carefully the moral-
ity and practicaiity of postinsanity acquittal procedures. 
We should be clear that it is unjust to punish someone who is not 
responsible. The argument that insanity acquittees who a re released 
early do not receive their just deserts is simply illogical and improper 
because nonresponsible persons do not deserve to be punished. A fixed 
hospital term, tied to the length of the prison sentence allowed for the 
crime charged, is also improper for the same reason: hospital commit-
ment should be related to continuing disorder, not to irrelevant punish-
ment concerns. 145 In large measure the terms of sentences are defined by 
the punishment the offender deserves. To the extent that incapacitation 
is a fac tor in determining the length of prison sentences, first, the general 
term is still limited by desert, and, second, the length of the particular 
term is calculated on the basis of a rational actor, whereas the criminal 
deed and dangerousness of the insanity acquittee is by definition the re-
sult of fundamental irrationality. The morally and socia lly appropriate 
response to a person who is acquitted on the ground of insanity but who 
is st ill dangerously disordered is nonpenal detention and reasonable 
treatment. The basic dilemma remains, however: by what criteria and 
procedures should an acquittee be committed and released? 
medica l care, which includes psychiatric treatment , for their se riou s menta l di sorders. In sum, I 
think that, as a logical matter, Youngberg and Gamble have commit ted the Supreme Co urt to at leas t 
a minimal, con stitutionally ba sed ri ght to psychiatric treatm ent for involuntary inrn :.ltes of any in st i-
tutio n who su tTer fro m serious menta l disord ers. 
145. See Jo nes v. United Sta tes, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3052 (1983). 
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1. Commitment and R elease Standards 
Confinement of an acquittee in a hospital makes no sense and is 
probably unconstitutional w·hen the committee reaches one of three dis-
tinct states : ( 1) dangero us but noncrazy; (2) nondangerous but crazy; or 
(3) crazy and dangerous but not dangerous as a result o f craziness . Let 
us consider these possibilities in order. 
First, an acquittee \vho is no longer disordered should be released; 
there is no mental hea lth reason to continue incarceration and punish-
ment has been rul ed out by the verdict of acquittaL Even though the 
noncrazy person remains dangerous, the danger no longer stems from 
mental disorder, and preventive detention for mere dangerousness in the 
mental health law system is almost certainly unconstitutional. 146 Many 
profess ionals believe, however, that severely disordered persons are in-
curable and can only be temporarily relieved of symptoms, especially by 
medication. Thus, there is no guarantee that such persons will not be-
come crazy again, especially if they fail, as many crazy persons do, to 
take their medication regularly after release. Critics also claim that it is 
easy to feign sanity, and that, even in the absence of any chicanery, 
mental health professionals cannot reliably determine if a person is 
cured. On the other hand, many mental health professionals believe that 
most acquittees' mental disorders can at least be controlled with reason-
able success, given proper treatment. There can be no certainty about 
cure, but reasonable estimates are possible. 
Second, if the person remains disordered but is no longer dangerous, 
confinement is likewise unwarranted if the person can live safely in the 
community, either alone or with the help of willing others such as family 
or friends. 147 In such cases, of course, society must directly confront 
how much weight should be given to mental health predictions of dan-
gerousness. Critics point out that mental health professionals are poor 
clinical predictors of long-term violence, a fact explicitly recogni zed by 
the American Psychiatric Association. 148 Consequently, we may have to 
use common sense to predict dangerousness, but we can be reasonably 
comforted by the knowledge that few released insanity acquittees commit 
heinous deeds. 149 If predictions of dangerousness can be used to support 
146. See Note, Developmenls in !he Law-Civil Commilm enl of !h e J'vfenwl!y Ill, 87 H ,\RV. L 
REV. 1190, 12 38 ( 1974) (deprivation of due process imposed by invo luntary com mitment). 
147. O'Connor v. D ona ldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975). 
148. See Ba refoot v. Es telle, 103 S. C t. 3383 , 3397 (1983) (c iting amicus brief of the American 
Psyc hia t ric Association). 
149. The recidivism rate of re leased acq uittees is apparently no grea ter tha n the recid ivism rate 
1985] THE 1/VSANITY DEFENSE 829 
the death penalty, 150 where an error means certain death, then society 
should certainly be willin g to assume the risk of possibly wrong predic-
tions of nondangerousness, which have far fewer certain harmful conse-
quences; 151 where liberty is at stake society should take risks. 
Third, in so me instances the committed acquittee may still be crazy 
and dangerous, but , although th e crime committed by the acquittee \Vas 
related to the craziness, the present dangerousness is not. 1 ~ 2 In sue!: 
cases, the acquittee should also be released because the purpose of a pos-
tinsanity acquittal commitment is no longer served: the person is no t 
dangerous because of men tal disorder, and future detention based on 
dangerousness alon e is unacceptable. Such a person is similar to a con-
victed person who is crazy and unrel atedly dangerous, and who must be 
released at the end of the prison term imposed. We will be tempted al -
ways to assume that the craziness does produce the dangerousness when 
considering insanity acquittees, but this will not always be so. The deter-
mination of whether the craziness and dangerousness are related will 
often be difficult, but it must be made if continuing commitment is to be 
justified. 
There are risks involved in releasing those acquitted by reason of 
insanity. Some acquittees will go crazy again, and some of those who do 
so will commit awful crimes. Nevertheless, the essence of a free society is 
taking some risks in the name of liberty and justice. Undeniably danger-
ous convicts are released when they complete their prison terms because 
we believe tha t they have paid the price for their crimes and that it is 
unfair to continue to hold them for merely preventive detention. Simi-
larly, if in the best judgments of mental health professionals and lay 
of matched, convicted felons. M YT HS AN D REALITIES, supra note 54, at 25-26; l' asewark, supra 
note 59, at 380-84. Th e rec idivi sm rate fo r rel eased acquittees is high , to be sure, but it is less 
worrisome than it first appea rs. There is ev idence that the s ubseq uent c rimes o f acq ui ttees are less 
violent than the ac t that led to th e insanit y acquit ta l. MYTHS AND REALITIES, supra note 54, a t 25-
26. M oreover, subseq uen t cr im inality appea rs not to be a product of mental d iso rd er, but is instead 
a function of prior c rimina lit y. Pasewark , Bieber, Bosten, Kise r & Steadman, Criminal R ecidivism 
A mong Jn sanily Acquillees, 5 INT' L J. L. & PsYCHIATRY 365 , 373 (1982). Finally, the nu mbe r of 
c rimes committed by acquittecs is small beca use there are so few acquittees. 
150. See Ba refoot v. Estelle , 103 S. C t. 3383, 3389-90 (1983). 
I 51. Predictions of no n dangerousness are far more likely to be right than predicti o ns of dan ger-
o usness. Indeed, to tal e rrors wou ld be reduced if everyone were predict ed to be nondan ge rous. 
Steadmcn & Morrissey, The S wtistical Predicrion of Violent Behavior: lvlea.wring rhe Costs of a 
Public Protectionist Versus a Civil Libertarian M odel, 5 LAW & HUM. BE!·IAV. 263, 271 Table 2 
( 198 1 ). 
I 52. Such a case can occur if the defendant was crazy and dan gerous in ways both rel ated and 
unrelated to th e offense . 
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factfinders a person acquitted by reason of insanity meets one of the three 
conditions just discussed, the acq ui ttee should be released. 
2. Commitment and Release Procedures 
If society accepts, as I believe it must, the moral a rgument for ta ki ng 
risks by releasing insanit y acquittees and the logica l criteria delineated 
ea rlier, 153 what remains to be reso lved is identifi cation of those proce-
d '-.lres wh ich should be used in the commitment and release of insanit y 
acqui ttees. Indeed, most of the postin sanity acquittal litiga tion has ad -
dressed this issue, usually focusing on whether insanity acquittees as a 
class can be constitutiona lly distinguished from civil committees . 154 The 
Supreme Court and other courts that have considered thi s issue have 
generally upheld such a distinction and, consequently, have also upheld 
both easier commitment procedures and more stringent release proce-
dures for insanity acquittees . 155 By contrast, I argue that differences be-
tween these classes of committees are minimal and should support only 
the barest procedural differences, if any. 
Because dangerousness produced by craziness is the touchstone of 
postinsanity commitment, what can be said about the mental condition 
and dangerousness of insanity acquittees at the time of acquittal? An 
insanity acquittal decides the following about the defendant 's conduct at 
the time of the crime: (1) it satisfied the prima facie elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt, 156 and (2)(a) when the prosecution bears the 
burden of persuasion on the in sanity issue, there is reasonable doubt 
whether the defendant was free of substan tia l mental di sorder and was 
responsible for the conduct, or, (2)(b) when the defendant bears the bur-
den of persuasion on the insani ty issue (usually by a preponderance of 
the evidence), more likely than not the defendant was severely crazy at 
the time of the offense and as a result was not legally responsible for the 
act. 
15 3. See supra text accompanying no tes 146-52. 
154. Note , Commitment Following an I nsanity Acquitlaf, 94 H ARV . L. R Ev. 605, 607-1 2 ( 198 1 ). 
155. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3051 (1983) (upholding the distinct io n in cases 
where the bu rden of persuasion on insanity was placed on the defendant by a preponderance of the 
evidence); e.g., U nited States v. Ecke r, 543 F.2d 178, 195-99 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cerl. denied, 429 U. S. 
1063 (1977); In re Frankli n, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141 -44,496 P .2d 465 , 474-75 , 101 Cal. Rptr. 55 3, 562 -63 
(1972); accord , Note, supra note 140, at 294-303 (l imi ting the distin ct ion to cases o f violent offend-
ers) . Conrra, e.g. , State v. C lemons, 110 Ariz. 79, 84, 5 15 P. 2cl 324, 329 ( 1973 ). 
156. Where the issues of insanity an d prima faci e guilt a re tried together, an insani ty acquitta l 
might not truly represent a find ing of pr ima fa cie gui lt. The insanity acquittal should be such a 
finding, however, because if pr im a faci e guilt is no t proven, the defendant should sim ply be acquit -
ted. In bi furcated tria l JUrisdict ions, th e prima facie elements are sat isfi ed . 
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The presumption of continuing mental diso rder based on an insanity 
acquittal, especially if the prosecution bore the burden of persuasion, is 
too weak to support more st ringent commitment procedures for acquit-
tees than for civil committees. Note aga in tha t any conclusions or pre-
sumptions arising from the acquittal ap ply to the acquittee' s conditi on at 
the time of th e crim inal act, whereas the com mitment decision is based 
on a men tal state that exists many months o r yea rs after the trial. To 
what extent is it reasonable to presum e that the mental disorder and con-
sequent dange rousness continue at the la ter elate? Defendants acquitted 
by insanity were normally quite crazy, that is, substan tially out of touch 
with reality , a t the time of the criminal act. Substantial lack of contact 
with reality-the touchstone of serious mental disorder-is also the pri-
mary cause of a defendant 's incompetence to stand trial. We can there-
fore be rel atively certain that an insanity acquittee, who was, by 
definition , competent to stand trial , was reasonably in touch with reality 
at the later time of trial. 157 Not only is it true that, in general, severe 
mental disorder abates naturally in many cases, and is especially likely to 
abate if treated, but we can also be sure that this has occurred in the case 
of insanity acquittees. Further, the mental disorders of insanity acquit-
tees are neither different from nor any harder to prove than the disorders 
of those subject to involuntary civil commitment: mental disorder is 
mental disorder. The mental disorder criterion provides no rational 
grounds for distinguishing between insanity acquittees and civil 
committees. 
The dangerousness criterion appears to provide firmer ground for 
treating insanity acquittees differently. Let us ass ume, as has the 
Supreme Court, 15 8 that the commission of almost any crime betokens 
dan gerousness. Because the conduct of all insanity acquittees satisfied 
the prima facie elements of some crime, almost all are ostensibly danger-
ous. By contrast, in many jurisdictions invo luntary civil commitment 
can be based on criteria other than dangerousness to others, and the cri-
157. One of th e difficu lti es with th e implicati ons of this assertion is that some defendants are 
competent to stand trial only if th ey con tinue taking psychotropic medi ca tion. This state of compe-
ten cc:-sometimes termed "synthetic sa nity"-has been held suffi cient to try a defendant. E. g. , State 
v. Pray, 133 Vt. 253, 336 A.2d 174 (\975). T he postacquitta l problem ari ses because many diso r-
dcr,~d persons whose craziness abates substantially when th ey take th eir medication may become 
quite crazy again if they stop taking the medication . Once disordered persons are released, of co urse, 
it is difficult to insure that they will cont inue to ta ke the ir medi ca tion. There is thus no guarantee 
th at, once released , the acquittee will no t becom e crazy and possibly dangerous again. This problem 
has caused at least one court to hold that a committed acq uittee cann ot be released until free of 
menta l disord er without med ication. Wolonsk y v. Balson, 387 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1976). 
15 8. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3049 (1983). 
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terion of dangerousness to others can be satisfied by threats and other 
conduct that would not satisfy the prima facie elements of a crime. It 
appears, then, that insanity acquittees as a class are more dangerous than 
civil committees, but the differences are mo re apparent than real. 
A ll civil committees a re not less dan ge rous than insanity acquittees. 
Some civil committees have engaged in co nduct that \vould satisfy the 
prima facie elements of a criminal offense. Moreover, it is reasonable to 
conclude that those civil committees wh o se ri ously threatened homicide 
or other severe harms are more dangerou s th an those who commit petty 
la rceny or other lesser harms, although only th e latter may be guilty of a 
criminal offense. Furthermore, although som e civil committees are at 
least as dangerous as those who may be criminally convicted, the civil 
commitment system does not treat such "specially dangerous" commit-
tees specially, and applies the same commitment criteria and procedures 
to all committees. Consequently, the dangerousness betokened by an in-
sanity acquittal is not greater than the dangerousness betokened by the 
conduct justifying civil commitment in many cases . In addition, because 
there are so few insanity acquittals and so many involuntary commit-
ments, there are surely more "specially dangerous" civil committees than 
insanity acquittees. Finally, involuntary civil commitment is usually 
based on immediately past "dangerous" behavior, whereas postinsanity 
acquittal commitment is usually based on a dangerous act-the crime-
that took place in the relatively distant past. Because the accuracy of 
behavioral predictions is positively correlated with the temporal immedi-
acy of the past behavior on which the prediction is based, we can be more 
certain of the dangerousness of involuntary civil committees. Distinc-
tions between classes need not be perfect to sa tisfy equal protection, but 
the dangerousness criterion is, at best, weak support for more onerous 
commitment procedures for the insanity acquittee. 
The only counterargument with much force is based on the percep-
tion that insanity acquittees have almost always committed acts so seri-
ous that the civil system is unwilling to handle them. Murderers, rapists , 
and aggravated assaulters, for example, are acquitted by reason of in-
sanity, but are rarely if ever processed solely in the civil system. 15 9 One 
concludes from this that acquittees are more dangerous as a class. Some 
159. Although there a rc no firm statistics to prove the latte r part o f this assertion , resea rch 
ev idence on the characteri sti cs of co mmittees supports this. See C. WARREN , THE CO URT OF L AST 
R ESO RT 170-74 (1 98 2); M onahan , Ca ldeira & Friedland er, Police and 1/ze J'v!etlially Ill: A Compari-
son of Com m illed and Arres1ed Persons, 2 l NT'L J. L. & PSYCHI ATRY 509, 513 ( 1979); M o nahan , 
Ruggie ro & Friedlander, Stone-Roth Model of Civil Commi1men1 and the Caltfomia Dangerousness 
S tandard, 39 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYC HI ATR Y 1267. 1267 (! 982) . M y expe rience wi th the c ivil 
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defendants are acquitted by reason of insanity for much less dangerous 
crimes, however, and many committees \Vho only threaten great harms 
such as homic ide or serious assault might well have committed these acts 
had they not been civ illy committed. Indeed , if we did not believe there 
was a substant ial likelihood that they would commit these acts, we would 
not commit them. Thus, the dangerousness di stinction is sti ll not as great 
as it first appears. Nonetheless, it is inescapably true that the re a re more 
actual, and not simply predicted, killers and aggravated assaulters among 
the in sanit y acq uittees than among the c ivi l comm ittees . The special 
dangerousness of the former again appears to be a rational reason to trea t 
them special ly . Is not society entitled to extra certainty of safety before 
such persons are released? 
If special criteria and procedures were applied on ly to those insanity 
acquittees who had committed acts so dangerous that the civil system 
would not process them, the distinction might hold. The Supreme Court 
held in Jon es v. United States, however, that insanity acquittees who had 
borne the burden of persuasion themselves were distinguishable as a 
class . 160 Given the general ambivalence about the insanity defense and 
insanity acquittees, we can be sure that most courts and legislatures will 
follow suit. For the reasons I have given, however, I do not believe that 
special treatment of all insanity acquittees as a class has rational support. 
Furthermore, the lapse of time between the crime and trial and the low 
recidivism rates for serious crimes suggest that perhaps even persons ac-
quitted by reason of insanity for se rious crimes should not be distin-
guished from involuntary committees . 
Assume that a distinction between insanity acquittees and civil com-
mittees is supportable. What procedural differences will fa irly and ra-
tionally support the social goals underlying the distinction? The two 
major differences between postinsanity acquittal com mitments and civil 
commitments are that, in the form er, initial commitment is often auto-
matic or adjudicated with a lower burden of persuasion and the burden 
of persuasion for release is placed on the acquittee. 16 1 Automatic com-
commitmen t sys tem in two jurisdictions a nd my conversa tions with othe rs familiar with this sys tem 
in othe r jurisdic ti ons a lso confirm my concl usion. 
160. I 03 S. Ct. 3043, 3045-46 (1 983) . 
161. A third maJOr difference is that acquittees can be rel eased only by judicial process, whereas 
commi tt ees ca n be released directly by the hospital. Morris, supra note 140 , at 86 1-62 , 885-88. This 
appears to be a substantiai impediment to the acquittec's re lease; for instance, som e courts have 
refused release despi te una nim ous psychiatric opinion that rel ease was justified. E.g., United States 
v. Ecker, 543 F.2d 178, 188-91 (D.C. Cir. 1976) , cert. denied, 429 U.S. I 063 ( 1977). Neverthel ess, I 
believe that this p roblem is less signitican t than the problems ra ised by those differences mentio ned 
in th e text becau se cou rts will genera ll y accept a unanimous psychiatric recommendation for re lease 
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mitment is justified by the presumption of continuing dangerousness re-
sulting from mental disorder based on the successful insanity defense. As 
I have shown, however, this presumption is not justified. 16 2 At most, the 
state should be entitled to brief custody after an insanity acquittal during 
which the acquittee can be evaluated for a commitment hearing to assess 
present disorder and consequent dangerousness. The cost of a new hear-
ing is outweighed by the acquittee's liberty interests. Social safety will 
not be compromised because the acquittee will be held until the hearing 
and then committed if the commitment criteria are satisfied. J\!Ioreover, 
the cost of a new hearing should be reduced for two r:easons: first, the 
state may rely on the evidence adduced at the criminal trial (weak 
though it may be because of the lapse of time) and, second, because the 
acquittee will have been in custody for a substantial period by the time of 
the commitment hearing, the state will have had substantial opportunity 
to make the observations that will support its case. In other words, much 
of the cost of observation time must be borne whether or not a commit-
ment hearing is held. Even if the cost is not reduced, it does not out-
weigh the defendant's interest in avoiding a particulariy harsh and 
intrusive liberty infringement. 
In involuntary civil commitment proceedings, the federal Constitu-
tion requires that the state bear the burden of persuasion by an interme-
diate standard of clear and convincing or clear and unequivocal 
evidence. 163 In addition, many states have held, on state constitutional 
grounds, that the state bears the burden of persuasion beyond a reason-
able doubt. 164 Although involuntary commitment in the civil system is 
not punishment for crime, the courts have recognized the committee's 
substantial interest in avoiding wrongful deprivation of liberty and impo-
sition of stigma. In contrast, the Supreme Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of placing the persuasion burden on the acquittee who wishes to 
be released in a postinsanity commitment proceeding. 165 Because acquit-
and hospitals are loath to release persons who have behaved highly dangerously unless they are quite 
confident that it is safe to do so. In light of society's interest in public safety, this procedural ditTer-
ence seems both small and JUStifiable, if any differences are justifiable. 
162. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text; accord, Note, supra note 154, at 607-12. 
163. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 418, 433 (1979). 
164. E.g., In re Roulet , 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d I, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979). 
165. Jones v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 3045-46 (1983). Courts have also upheld a lower 
burden of persuasion at the initial commitment hearing on many of the same grounds. Even if ac-
quittees are a distinguishable class, however, the risk of erroneous deprivation of liberty at a postac-
quittal commitment hearing is as great as at a civil commitment hearing, and arguably, thaefore, the 
persuasion burden should not be lowered at the former. Note, supra note 154, at 612-17. Moreover, 
if acquittees are so obviously crazily dangerous, as proponents of the lowered burden contend, the 
state ought to have little difficulty meeting the higher burden. This is especially so because the 
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tees a re allegedly more dangerous, the risk of their wrongful rel ease is 
greater than the ri sk for civil committees and society is therefore entitled 
to reduce the risk of releasing acquittees by placing the burden of persua-
sion on them. Indeed, suggested pos t-Hinckley changes have placed the 
burd en of persuasion on committees by the intermediate standard of 
clear and convincing evidence. 166 This is a difficult standard for the ac-
quitt ee to meet, especial ly because the factfi nder will know tha t the ac-
quit tee actually committed a criminal act. 
Shifting the bu rde n of persuasion to acquittees in order to red uce the 
risk of wrongful release may be rational if there is any su ppo rtable dis-
tinction between acquittees and committees, but thi s rationale weakens 
as time passes. The accuracy with which one can predict the acquittee's 
future crazy dangerousness on the basis of the act for which the person 
was acquitted decreases markedly as the time between the act and the 
prediction increases. After some period of time, future dangerousness 
based on the prior ac t does not justify shifting the burden of persuasion. 
At such a point, there is so little predictable dangerousness based on the 
prior dangerous behavior alone and so much liberty interest at stake for 
the acquittee that the burden of persuasion should shift back to the state . 
But at what po int should the burden of persuasion shift back to the 
state? Unfortunately, there are no data to indicate how much the risk of 
various harms decreases over time. We simply know that, in general, it 
does. Some have tried to deal with this dilemma by using the length of 
the prison term allowed for the acquittee's charged crime to dictate when 
th e burden must shift. 167 If prison terms were based purely or even pri-
m aril y on dangerousness concerns, this calculation might make sense, 
but, because this is not the case, we must find a different standard. Where 
data are lack ing, the time period must be essentially arbitrary. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has held tha t incompetence to stand trial com-
mitments can last for only a "reasonable length of time" before the state 
must institu te normal civil commitment proceedings or release the in-
competent defendant. 168 Thus, perhaps the best the law can do is to place 
a "reasonableness" time limit on the period during which the acquittee 
must bea r the burden of persuasion . In no case should it be longer than 
dan ge rousness of acquittees will be based on acts , whereas that of commi ttees will o ft en be based on 
less determinate threa ts. 
166. E.g., The Insanity Defense Refo rm Act of 1984, Pub. L. N o. 98 -473, § 40.3, 1984 U.S. 
COD E CoNG. & AD. N EWS (98 Stat. ) 2057. 
167. T hi s was the defendant's claim in Jon es, 103 S. Ct. at 3044. S ee In re M oye, 22 Cal. 3d 
457 , 463-68, 584 P 2d 1097, 11 01-04, 149 Cal. Rptr. 49 i , 495-98 (197 8). 
168. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 ( 1972) . 
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the maximum term of incarceration permitted for the defendant's crime 
because dangerousness has at least some bearing on the length of prison 
or jail terms; thus, some nonarbitrary maximum time limit can be fixed. 
And in cases of serious crimes that carry very long sentences, the time 
allowed, paradoxically, should be shorter than the maximum incarcera-
tion period for the crime. 
CONCLUSION 
If we hate and fear crazy criminals too much and mistrust the re-
lease decisions of both mental health professionals and lay factfinders, we 
might decide to abolish the insanity defense or never to release those 
judged insane because we cannot be sure they are no longer disordered or 
dangerous (assuming the constitutionality of such a practice). If so, let 
us openly confront the injustice of the convictions or of the unnecessary 
and massive preventive detention of individuals wrongly held that will 
inevitably occur. If the real reason we do not wish to release those 
judged insane is an underlying desire to punish them, let us confront our 
hypocrisy and abolish the defense. 
The cost to our society of valuing liberty so highly is that it increases 
the danger to us all, but we believe that the benefits of our freedom are 
worth the costs. Some released insanity acquittees, like many released 
convicts, will commit awful crimes again, but the number of the former 
will be small and their recidivism often will not be linked to mental disor-
der. I do not mean to minimize the difficulties in deciding whom to ac-
quit or release, or the outrages that may be perpetrated by some released 
insanity acquittees. But the insanity defense is not responsible for the 
ghastly crime rate in our society, and, as a group, released insanity ac-
quittees probably are not a substantial danger to society. Convicting and 
imprisoning nonresponsible, insane persons, or keeping all persons ac-
quitted by reason of insanity incapacitated for life, will not make anyone 
appreciably safer. Societal safety will be enhanced far more if a higher 
percentage of those convicted of serious crimes serve the prison time that 
they deserve. Unlike insanity acquittees, these dangerous criminals ac-
count for a very high proportion of social danger, which their increased 
incapacitation would substantially reduce. 
We should not abolish the insanity defense unless we truly believe 
that every perpetrator of a criminal act deserves to be punished, no mat-
ter how crazy. If we do not believe this, and I do not see how we can, 
then we must retain the defense. 
